From your response to Michael's comment, I think I see what you're looking for, and why it's confusing. There's no current "list" of meanings for the word "intention", as you'll probably find that such a list will be exactly as long as the number of philosophers there are. However, there are two broad senses in which the word gets thrown around, and it's clear you want only one of them.
Most of us here at this site, when hearing "intention" will immediately think of intentionality, which is an unfortunate piece of philosophical jargon that gets newcomers very confused. I've heard it said that the word is just a poor translation from German (Husserl's word was "Intentionalität"), but regardless of it's origin, the term corresponds roughly to the actual, subjective perception of a thing's qualities: the "redness" of the color red, or the intense smelliness of an acrid smell. The idea being reached for is what a given perception is about- that is, the perception's content. For this reason some people replace the term "intentionality" with "about-ness".
I'm fairly certain from your response that you want nothing to do with intentionality. Instead, it's clear that you want a way of recognizing what it means for someone to intend something, in the way that you intended a certain meaning by your question here. If I'm right, and I've successfully accomplished what you want your program to achieve - that is, to recognize what you intend - then I'd hazard to say that what you're looking for isn't intention per se, but a philosophical description of will. At least, it seems to me that you're looking for a way of capturing the algorithm we all supposedly use to recognize when someone else has a desire for some outcome, and is making an effort of some kind to acheive that outcome. The notion that "will" captures in philosophic discussion is a much better fit than "intention" for your search.
-- Edited --
I'm trying to separate the verb to intend from the noun intention in order to distinguish between the subjective, first-person sense of having an intention towards a thing (which is to say that person intends a thing), and the objective, observable state of an organism's brain while that intention is being had. To recognize the subjective, mental intention of another person is either impossible or currently unrealizable, so the latter sense of there being an observable part of an intention must be what we're talking about. To clarify, take the following cases:
- Andy intends to raise his hand the moment Barbara stops speaking.
- Andy shuffles in his seat as he waits for Barbara to stop speaking.
In the first example, there's no indication given of Andy having an intention, other than that I've stated it. Andy has the experience of intending to raise his arm, but how would any observer recognize what he intends without something like the second example occurring? Only if there's a physical signifier of Andy's intention, whether that signal is shuffling impatiently in his chair, or the more subtle neural activity of Andy's brain, can "intention recognition" occur.
Many people argue that there must be a unique physical signifier for every experience, where intending a thing is just one such experience. Whether that's true or not is a messy debate. On the other hand, we all engage in a much more mundane form of "intention recognition" by announcing our intentions through speech and writing. It's not a perfect system: bullshit still abounds, misleading people with regards to what people actually intend.