I was considering a solution to the omnipotence paradox in which excluding logical impossibilities from the definition of omnipotence is justified as follows. Consider the proposition, "God could create a round triangle" (add additional qualifiers, here and to the solution, if you feel there is not a true contradiction). If we don't want to say such a statement is true, which most theists do not, we must ask why it's not true. It seems the proposition can be divided into in three parts:
1) If X exists, it is round
2) If X exists, it is a triangle
3) God could cause X to exist.
The proposition can be sensibly said not to affect the definition of omnipotence because it is the conjunction of 1 and 2 that cannot be true. A round triangle is not a "thing." The problem has nothing to do with the truth value of 3. Perhaps we could paraphrase by saying it's not the instantiation of a round triangle that causes the problem, but the mere concept of a round triangle.
What I'm curious about is whether such a solution to omnipotence paradoxes carries any weight at all on Meinongian views. Would a round triangle, a married bachelor, or a stone too heavy for God to move exist in Meinong's Jungle? If so, is there any reason such things could not "exist in the world," so to speak, aside from God's inability to instantiate them?