At least one philosophical position operated without faith:
We necessarily assign freedom of will to us and others, even if we and they might not have it, i.e. we are not able to prove it theoretically. It makes no difference, because by acting accordingly, we make the idea of free/moral agency factual. As operating with necessity, faith plays no role here.
See Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Ak. 447-8, Cambridge Edition pp. 64-5, especially the footnote. I will quote the whole paragraph as pointing out the main aspects without loosing necessary context would end up there, anyway:
Freedom must be presupposed
as a quality of the will of all rational beings.
It is not enough that we ascribe freedom to our will, on whatever grounds,
if we do not also have sufficient grounds to attribute the same quality also to
all rational beings. For since morality serves as a law for us merely as for
rational beings, it must also be valid for all rational beings, and since it must
be derived solely from the quality of freedom, therefore freedom must also
be proved as a quality of the will of all rational beings, and it is not enough to || establish it from certain alleged experiences of human nature (although this
is absolutely impossible, and it can be established solely a priori); but rather
one must prove it of the activity of rational beings in general, who are
endowed with a will. Now I say: Every being that cannot act otherwise than
under the idea of freedom is precisely for this reason actually free in a
practical respect, i.e., all laws inseparably combined with freedom are valid
for it, just as if its will had also been declared
free in itself and in a way that is
valid in theoretical philosophy.* Now I assert that we must necessarily lend to every rational being that has a will also the idea of freedom, under which
alone it would act. For in such a being we think a reason that is practical, i.e.,
has causality in regard to its objects. Now one cannot possibly think a reason [Vernunft]
that, in its own consciousness, would receive steering from elsewhere in
regard to its judgments; for then the subject would ascribe the determination
of its power of judgment not to its reason but to an impulse. It must regard
itself as the author of its principles independently of alien influences; consequently it must, as practical reason or as the will of a rational being, be
regarded by itself as free, i.e., the will of a rational being can be a will of its
own only under the idea of freedom and must therefore with a practical aim
be attributed to all rational beings.
*I take this route, of assuming freedom as sufficient for our aim only as
rational beings ground it on the idea in their actions, so that I may not be
obligated to prove freedom also in its theoretical intent. For even if this
latter is left unsettled, these same laws that would obligate a being that is
actually free are still valid for a being that cannot act otherwise than as under the idea of its own freedom. Thus we can free ourselves of the burden
that pressures theory.
That also means that whoever and whatever we think to have reason and conciousness is blamable for us, may it be a dog or the weather.