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In CPJ, Kant seems to imply that rational gender-necessary-reproductive-species (humans) cannot claim other of the same species humans as beautiful based upon our base desires and inability to escape the a priori nature therein (a few of the quotes have been provided). Is this claim accurate in the depiction of humans, according to Kant?

§Introduction One must likewise admit that the teleological judgment is grounded on a principle a priori and would be impossible without such a principle, although in such judgments we discover the end of nature solely through experience and without that we could not know that things of this sort are even possible. That is, the teleological judgment, although it connects a determinate concept of an end, on which it grounds the possibility of certain natural products, with the representation of the object (which does not happen in the aesthetic judgment), is nevertheless always only a judgment of reflection, just like the former. It does not presume at all to assert that in this objective purposiveness nature (or another being acting through nature) in fact proceeds intentionally, i.e., that in it, or its cause, the thought of an end determines the causality, but rather only that we must utilize the mechanical laws of nature in accordance with this analogy (relations of causes and effects), in order to cognize the possibility of such objects and to acquire a concept of them which can provide them with an interconnection in an experience that can be systematically arranged.

§2 Everyone must admit that a judgment about beauty in which there is mixed the least interest is very partial and not a pure judgment of taste.

§5 The agreeable, the beautiful, and the good therefore designate three different relations of representations to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, in relation to which we distinguish objects or kinds of representations from each other. The expressions appropriate to each of these, by means of which one designates the pleasure in each of them, are also not the same. Agreeable is that which everyone calls what gratifies him; beautiful, what merely pleases him; good, what is esteemed, approved, i.e., that on which he sets an objective value.......One can say that among all these three kinds of satisfaction only that of the taste for the beautiful is a disinterested and free satisfaction; for no interest, neither that of the senses nor that of reason, extorts approval.

§13 Taste is always still barbaric when it needs the addition of charms and emotions for satisfaction, let alone if it makes these into the standard for its approval. And yet charms are not only often included with beauty (which should properly concern merely form) as a contribution to the aesthetic universal satisfaction, but are even passed off as beauties in themselves, hence the matter of satisfaction is passed off for the form: a misunderstanding which, like many others that yet always have something true as their ground, can be eliminated by careful determination of these concepts.

§14 Emotion, a sensation in which agreeableness is produced only by means of a momentary inhibition followed by a stronger outpouring of the vital force, does not belong to beauty at all.

These last two quotes directly address the questionable nature of our judgment upon our fellow species, I believe.

§4 In respect to happiness, finally, everyone believes that the greatest sum (in terms of number as well as duration) of the agreeableness of life can be called a true good, indeed even the highest good. But reason also balks at this. Agreeableness is enjoyment.

§83 The concept of happiness is not one that the human being has, say, abstracted from his instincts and thus derived from the animality in himself; rather, it is a mere idea of a state to which he would make his instincts adequate under merely empirical conditions (which is impossible).

In the end, I would say if happiness and instinct are inter-related to agreeableness and therefore, by extension, emotion, then we cannot make judgments of beauty on fellow human beings, because of our base, animalistic instincts, or, as the introduction puts it, although not in addressing it from that perspective, we're "another being acting through nature".

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    Would you please quote or at least mention the source (Section no.)? "In CPJ" isn't a good reference. Neither "human form" nor "human body" in a full text search bring up any hits. – Philip Klöcking Jun 13 '16 at 12:16
  • @Philip Klöcking There are a lot, but I think the quote I added will directly reflect an answer to your question. It relates to "rational being" relations and the sensual desires inherant within a species. If you do feel further quotes and examples are necessary I can pull more. – NationWidePants Jun 13 '16 at 13:26
  • I'm not grasping how the quote from section 2 helps make the question clearer... – virmaior Jun 13 '16 at 13:47
  • I think you are just thinking in absolutistic terms here. One of Kant's main figures is "insofar". Insofar we only reflect on the sensible intuition of a human body, we can judge it as beautiful, insofar we have interest and desires regarding it, it is useful, insofar we consider the human form as a moral agent, the person it embodies is an object of respect. I do not get how this would be contradictous in any way. – Philip Klöcking Jun 13 '16 at 14:09
  • @Philip Klöcking It almost seemed that he was saying "if you find something 'beautiful' but you desire it, in the 'barbaric' way, then it cannot be seen as truly beautiful because you cannot distinguish between the two aesthetics and view it as a free and rational judgment". Am I incorrect in my statement? – NationWidePants Jun 13 '16 at 14:17

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