Source: p 272 Bottom-273 Top, Introducing Philosophy for Canadians: A Text with Integrated Readings (2011 1 ed).
Primary Source: 'Could Truth Be Coherence with a System of Beliefs?' by Uni. of Victoria Prof. James O. Young
[p 271:] The argument for this coherentism can be summarised as follows:
(P1) For a proposition to be true is for it be justifiable.
(P2) A proposition can only be justified by coherence with a system of beliefs.
[Ergo] (C) For a proposition to be true[,] is for it to be justified by coherence with a system of beliefs.
[pp 272-273:] Another objection to the coherence theory challenges the coherentist to specify the system of beliefs with which propositions cohere. The charge is that coherentists cannot do so without contradicting their position.
[4.] A simple version of this objection, developed by Bertrand Russell, states that the coherence theory has the consequence that patent falsehoods are true. The proposition that
(3) Sir John A. MacDonald [1st Prime Minister of Canada] was a teetotaler
coheres with some set of propositions. But MacDonald was known to have drank quite a lot of alcohol in his lifetime, and accounts of his behaviour survive for us in historical records. One could write an alternative universe novel in which MacDonald never drank alcohol, yet (3) is obviously false, when faced with what is recorded in history. More generally, any proposition can be made to cohere with some set of propositions.
[5.] Russell charged that coherentists cannot respond to this objection by saying that that (3) IS false because it coheres with a set of propositions that do not correspond to reality. This would be to contradict their theory of truth, by assuming that some propositions correspond to reality
[6.] The coherentist can, however, simply say that Russell’s objection misses the mark because it mischaracterizes the coherence theory. Coherentists never said that true propositions cohere with just any set Of propositions. They cohere with a set of beliefs, of propositions held to be true.
How does 6 rebut 5 (Russell's objection)? 6 only restates the Conclusion above which (I presume) Russell would have read already.
Do the Coherentists rebut 4? 6 does not explain how to preclude a falsehood from being believed.