I was recently reading Russell's chapter on Parmenides in The History of Western Philosophy, and I came across a fun little argument for the absence of change. Essentially, it says that word meaning cannot refer to anything in the past or anything in the future; therefore, whatever words we use and their meanings we wish to convey must be existing in the present.
Russell's solution used George Washington as an example; our discourse no longer is about the man George Washington unless he is before us in the present, and we know him. Whenever we use the name "George Washington," we are actually referring to perceptions carried from other people's memories. In this sense, we are never actually referring to "George Washington." Whenever we use the name "George Washington," we are only referring to what others have said about/recorded of him or what others recall of him, but never to the actual "George Washington" per se.
I recognize that Quine had a quite different conception of meaning, claiming that meanings are not entities, as words can mean even if they are referent-less; and, indeed, intensionally, "George Washington" does not mean "the first president of the United States." How would have Quine (or Davidson) responded to Parmenides' argument as described in Russell's History?