Motivation (but not on): p 335, Introducing Philosophy for Canadians: A Text with Integrated Readings (2011 1 ed).
Primary Source: Paragraph 14, CHAPTER XXVII, OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY; An Essay Concerning Human Understanding BOOK 2; by John Locke.
- Personality in Change of Substance.
But the question is, Whether if the same substance which thinks be changed, it can be the same person; or, remaining the same, it can be different persons?
And to this I answer: First, This can be no question at all to those who place thought in a purely material animal constitution, void of an immaterial substance. For, whether their supposition be true or no, it is plain they conceive personal identity preserved in something else than identity of substance; as animal identity is preserved in identity of life, and not of substance. And therefore
those who place thinking in an immaterial substance only, before
theycan come to deal with these men, must show why personal identity [2.] cannot [End of 2.] be preserved in the change of immaterial substances, or variety of particular immaterial substances, as well as animal identity is preserved in the change of material substances, or variety of particular bodies: unless they will say, it is one immaterial spirit that makes the same life in brutes, as it is one immaterial spirit that makes the same person in men; which the Cartesians at least will not admit, for fear of making brutes thinking things too.
[ 2007 Paraphrase, p 116 : ] 12. But it is asked: Can it be the same person if the substance changes? and Can it be different persons if the same substance does the thinking throughout? ·Before I address these questions in sections 13 and 14, there’s a preliminary point I want to make. It is that· neither question is alive for those who hold that thought is a property of a purely material animal constitution, with no immaterial substance being involved. Whether or not they are right about that, they obviously conceive personal identity as being preserved in something other than identity of substance; just as animal identity is preserved in identity of life, not of substance. ·This pair of questions does present a challenge to· •those who hold that only immaterial substances can think, ·and that sameness of person requires sameness of immaterial substance. Before •they can confront their materialist opponents, they· have to show why personal identity can’t be preserved through a change of immaterial substances, just as animal identity is preserved through a change of material substances. Unless they say that what makes the same life ·and thus the animal identity· in lower animals is one immaterial spirit, just as (according to them) one immaterial spirit makes the same person in men—and Cartesians at least won’t take that way out, for fear of making the lower animals thinking things too.
In 2, should not the 'cannot' be CAN? It is the materialists (and NOT
those who place thinking in an immaterial substance only) who reject any immaterial substance, and a fortiori change of immaterial substances.