Source: p 362 Top. Introducing Philosophy for Canadians: A Text with Integrated Readings (2011 1 ed).
Nagasena's point? As it is with 'chariot', so it is with 'person'. Like 'chariot', 'person' refers not to a substance—there are no substances in the Buddhist scheme—but simply [1.] to a set of attributes that we can directly apprehend or know [End of 1.]. In the case of a chariot, those attributes are the axle, the wheels, the poles, the yoke, the reins, the flag-post, and so forth. In the case of a person, those attributes are transient phenomena known to Buddhist as 'the five skandhas': 'forms, feelings, perceptions, impulses, and consciousness'. So if a person is nothing more than a bundle of ever-changing attributes, then there is nothing to him over and above those attributes; and if there is nothing to him over and above those ever-changing attributes, then there is nothing to which a name such as 'Nagasena' can correspond or refer. There is no fixed 'I', no substantial soul, no rock-solid self, no enduring ego, no static core of being hidden beneath the flimsy wrapping of phenomenal fact.
[ Buddhism.about.com : ] Now the King acknowledged the designation "chariot" depended on these constituent parts, but that "chariot" itself is a concept, or a mere name.
Just so, Nagasena said, "Nagasena" is a designation for something conceptual. It is a mere name. [2.] When the constituent parts are present [End of 2.] we call it a chariot; [2.] When the Five Skandhas are present [End of 3.] , we call it a being.
I abbreviate 1-3 (i.e. attributes + the dependence on the constituent attributes) to 'Synergy'. So a Synergy ⊋ this Synergy's attributes.
Nagasena argues that names (e.g. 'Nagasena', 'chariot') refer to Synergy.
But why cannot Synergies (1 and 2) be Substances? Synergies must be something, correct?