Is 'world' perhaps a characteristic of Dasein's Being ? And in that case, does every Dasein 'proximally' have its world ? Does not 'world' thus become something 'subjective' ? How, then, can there be a 'common' world 'in' which, nevertheless, we are ? And if we raise the question of the 'world', what world do we have in view ? Neither the common world nor the subjective world, but the worldhood of the world as such.
Being and Time p64.
Can this worldhood of the world as such, which interests Heidegger, be made to fit with the world we are in in common?
I'm asking because I am trying to find out where Heidegger says that the world is never a perceptual object in its own right. Apparently section 28, cited by Jameson The Political Unconscious p98. Knowing the answer to this question should also enrich my intuitive grasp on what it is Heidegger is trying to do.