Relation between Existence of Free Will and Existence of the Self

Question

So, I am a student in mathematics and physics with no formal training in philosophy whatsoever, although I enjoy reading popular discussions of philosophical questions. However, my question is bound to be vague and badly phrased, for which I apologise in advance.

There is one thing about the debate on the existence of free will that always bothers me. I get that if you consider a human being from a physics perspective, that is, as a sum of physical processes, whether deterministic or not, then it doesn't may not make much sense to attribute to said organism such a thing as free will. However, in that case it doesn't make much sense to me to talk about the organism as having an identity at all - talking about that particular organism would just be a short-cut to talk about the underlying processes. On the other hand, once you assume that "you" is actually an existing thing, then of course it makes sense to talk about free will as well - on the level where "you" exists, so do emotions, thoughts, decisions and free will. The different levels here appear quite important to me: both world-views are equally 'true', but sometimes it's useful to talk at one level and sometimes to talk about the other.

To make an analogy with physics: as long as you see a room filled with gas as a collection of molecules flying around, then notions such as pressure and temperature don't make sense. However, on the macro scale they do and are useful in understanding the world.

So, the point I try to make: to me it seems like the existence of free will and the existence of an "I" are very much intertwined. Assume the existence of one and you get the other, and any argument against the existence of free will applies equally well as an argument of the existence of you.

(The follow-up of this argument for me would be to argue, with I suppose Decartes, that a world-view in which I do not exist is much more unreasonable than a world-view that is not supported by my perception).

I never see this link being made in popular discussions on free will. Does the argument have any merit? Can you recommend any readings that explore this?

Answer 1

The perspective you are pointing at is emergentism. From that perspective, the problem is that the physical point of view simply lacks adequate context to express the notion of identity and will, not that it actually conflicts with the idea.

As you point out, physics proper does not handle notions like pressure very well. It has even more trouble with notions like acidity. Without the context of the 'bond' to identify which hydrogens are 'free' which can only be observed from a more complex POV than the laws of physics capture well, acidity is not a thing. That does not in any way make us doubt that chemistry has reasonably defined acids.

But somehow, many of us are quite willing to look at the physical sciences together and assume that they should either correctly identify identity and will, or those things do not exist. From a higher-level psychological point of view, it is obvious that identity and will exist, and philosophical takes on rational psychology and political theory do think about that.

From a point of view in one of those frameworks, say psychoanalysis, or Existentialism, you can reasonably say that if you have one of 'identity' and 'will', you get the other. For instance, for Kleinian psychoanalysis will is what allows an identity to detect that it is different from its source, and a maturing will establishes and clarifies its identity in order to defend itself from merger back into that source. From Sartre's perspective, 'will' is the illusion of freedom which we must maintain in order to have responsibility, and we insist upon having responsibility as a way of maintaining our identity.

But if these are properly emergent phenomena, the way chemistry is an emergent framing of physics (which 'supervenes on it', as such people say), then 'will' may still be determined (as the idea it is a necessary illusion points out). More complexity does not necessarily reduce the ultimate nature of cause, it may just hide deterministic cause in the cover of mathematical chaos. If there is not already indeterminacy at the lower level, it should not arise at the upper level.

There are all kinds of arguments that there is no 'free will' in randomness, and randomness and determinism together never result in choice. But, to my mind, they are pasting the ideas together wrong. One can easily say there is 'freedom' in randomness, but there is no 'will'. But then there is no reason 'will' cannot result from an emergence from physics and get its 'free' nature from the underlying randomness.

As a parallel example, one can say there is no 'intention' in genes because there is no 'consciousness'. But that does not mean there cannot be 'intention' in a being derived from those genes. Consciousness arises as an emergent aspect of survival, as a way of keeping better track of one's environment. Then, added to the goal of survival itself, this emergence easily explains how 'intention' is still possible.

Answer 2

If I understand well where you are coming (mathematics and physics), my answer to your question is "yes" there are intertwined. Furthermore, since the notions of "I" and free will (or lack thereof) are fundamental assumptions (hypotheses), any reasoning concerning them is likey to be circular. Possibly, discussions on their respective merits are also moot.

I assume you are hovering around the logical question of a prime mover unmoved. Something that can issue an original idea must be a cause without an effect, if only in a microscopic part. In energy terms, it must have issued something from nothing.

There are two ways to look at it:

1. Either, as a not insignificant portion of modern thinkers (influenced by neurosciences), you consider that the law of conservation of energy is inviolable. In which case any thought about free will is bound to be a form of delusion. But in that case, you have to reject a large part of human philosophical traditions, including a significant part of the thinkers of the Enlightenment.
2. Or you are willing to pursue on your line of thought, in which case you have to admit some form of singularity, where the principle of conservation of energy might not apply, at least in the terms we envisage it. If you pursue even further, you might to have to make a few more assumptions about space and time.

As you see, it's a tough choice, where you are going to lose either the inviolability of the principle of conservation of energy, or the inviolability of deep-rooted intuitions and most philosophical traditions.

All is not lost. Mathematicians and physicists can live with singularities, knowing that they are bound (at the risk of oversimplifying: without being afraid that airplanes will fall from the sky and GPS will stop working). For the rest of society, the notions of incompleteness and singularities are not palatable (hence the initial skepticism about black holes).

As Richard Feynman used to say: "I don't feel frightened by not knowing things". Which is why we might get some advances from that side, rather than from other disciplines where doctrines are more radicated.

As you realize the debate is not only philosophical or (anti-)religious, it is also highly political since free will and freedom of thought (in a social and political sense) are closely connected. According to the position 1 and 2, the imperative of defending freedom of speech, research, etc. might be interpreted in very different ways. With 2, it is necessary, with 1 it is contingent and conventionally accepted as merely functional.

Answer 3

I think the problem lies in your assertion here;

once you assume that "you" is actually an existing thing, then of course it makes sense to talk about free will as well - on the level where "you" exists, so do emotions, thoughts, decisions and free will.

If "you" is the collection of cells which are sufficiently connected to one another to be seen as a collective (at one arbitrary scale), then we have a definition of "you" which is meaningful but does not necessitate free will. Emotions, thoughts and decisions certainly seem contained within this collective, but the spontaneous appearance of a causal entity does not necessarily follow. For free will, there needs to be either a physical cause (in which case it is not really free, being constrained by the physical nature of the cause) or a non-physical world from which the cause can be generated by the "I" in your argument. Whilst this non-physical world may well be possible, it is not necessitated by the discussion of an "I", which is simply a categorisation of a collection of cells.

Similarly, the effects which the thoughts and emotions of said collection of cells lead to is not restricted to that collection. Our state of mind and actions clearly influences that of other people so there is no reason to see the "you" boundary as equal to the boundary of our apparent ability to determine action. I can no more guarantee that I will catch a ball despite my intention to do so than I can guarantee that my friend will despite my instruction to do so.

Equally our life would be impossible without the bacteria which inhabit our gut yet we have no connection to their impulses at all. We do not however, feel this as a significant challenge to our sense of self, it's just a biological feature that you have no neural network connection to that aspect of "you".

Nor is this distinction between the reality of the physical "you" and the illusion of the metaphysical "you" a radical or unwieldy one. We deal with it all the time as a society in mental illness and brain damage. We do not presume that the voices in the head of schizophrenics are real simply because they report them to be. We assume, without any trouble at all, that they are an illusion, that their neurons are reporting something which isn't there. That we have such trouble seeing free will this way speaks more about our discomfort with the fact than it does about any deeply true intuition about it.

For further reading I suggest you try Bruce Hood's "The Self Illusion" and V.S Ramachandran's "The Tell Tale Brain", or Daniel Dennett's "Conciousness Explained". All three have their critics, of course, but Together they at least show how free will needn't exist just because we feel it does, or because there is an identifiable agent "you".

Answer 4

Scipio, Concurrence from me, great question, very well phrased! It appears that the 'scientifically' oriented aspects of your question have been addressed, so this response will be on the philosophical. As a focal point, Spinoza first came to be known as the most capable interpreter of Descartes' thinking. He published,

'Descartes' Principles of Philosophy". It is not an easy read because Spinoza wrote in a quasi-geometric method. But, to respond to your query, let's examine your comment; "On the other hand, once you assume that "you" is actually an existing thing, then of course it makes sense to talk about free will as well - on the level where "you" exists, so do emotions, thoughts, decisions and free will." Descartes espoused the notion that 'Cogito ergo sum', "I think therefore I am", denotes the 'nature' of a human being and that 'free will' coupled with this organic intellectual capability together, formed a nexus which defines human nature. And so, quite naturally, in your comment you included free will with the other listed items.

Spinoza now enters the picture and says two things; 1- That even though he did indeed write commentary on Descartes' philosophy he did not concur with Descartes conclusions. And 2- Spinoza maintains that free will is an imaginary bi-product of the case that humans 'recognize' what happens in their lives but are 'unaware of the causes' which precipitate these happenings and therefore attribute them to free will. He maintained that everything which happens to us on a daily basis is a direct result of occurrences which affected us in the past (even from the circumstances of our birth), which he termed the 'necessity of our nature'. This is not determinism. We simply do not have the scope to automatically 'see' all of the factors which 'cause' us to make the choices that we do make.

I do realize that this 'response' does not directly respond to your question, but think that bringing up the questionable nature of 'free will' is vital part of any discussion of human individuality. To conclude: your thoughtful and well articulated response to this very real conundrum of identity and free will, for me, marks you as a philosophical person in your own right. I'm certain that there are Philosophy programs everywhere that would welcome someone who thinks so deeply and expresses himself so clearly. Sapere Aude

https://www.amazon.com/Best-Sellers-Books-Free-Will-Determinism-Philosophy/zgbs/books/11041

Answer 5

In complement to @Isaacson, there is a very simple reasoning for determining that the identity of self and free will don't have to be intertwined (they might be, but they clearly don't have to).

As Descartes said, "I think, therefore I am." Whatever might be the source of my thought, feelings, emotions and sensations, even if I am a pure spirit, a physicalist body or a mere process in a high level computer simulation, it is manifest that there is something having these toughts, emotions and sensations. This something, I call "I", and there can be no doubt that this "I" feels. I don't know about anyone else, but I know about me (and I assume people around me know about themself in the very same way). And the fact that I am the only one to feel my feelings gives me a pretty good idea of what "identity" can be.

But how about my will ? At least, some philosophers doubt that we have any free will (Spinoza, for instance: "people believe they are free only because they are conscious of their actions while they ignore the reasons that determine them to act." - approximate translation, sorry). It is at least quite obvious that we are not fully in control of our actions. Cognitive biases are a good example of external influence upon our very desires and actions. Drug induced behaviors also come to mind: drunk people often take actions they would never take when sober. Yet, while the alcohol is clearly a cause of their behavior, at the very moment they act they don't feel less free than in their usual state. If the free will of a drunk person is an illusion, the idea that the free will of a sober person is just as illusory gains leverage.

So, while it can't be doubted that "I" is the recipient of my feelings, it can be doubted that "I" is the origin of my will. One can reasonably consider that we have a sense of self, yet no free will.