Boris, yes, those are good working explanations of the terms.
Similarly, as intensionality (not to be confused with intentionality) is intrinsic, it can be thought of as "analytic" and, as extensionality involves things in the world, extension can be thought of as "synthetic".
A more technical distinction per Searle:
"Intensionality-with-an-s is that property of statements, and other
sorts of representations, by which they fail certain tests for
extensionality. The two favorite tests are the substitutability of
coreferring expressions without loss or change of truth value
(sometimes called Leibniz's Law) and existential generalization.
For example, the statement "Oedipus wants to marry Jocasta" fails the
substitutability test, because together with the statement "Jocasta is
identical with his mother" it does not permit the inference: "Oedipus
wants to marry his mother." The statement is intensional with respect
to substitutability. Statements that fail the substitutability test
are sometimes called referentially opaque. The statement "Oedipus is
looking for the lost city of Atlantis" does not permit the existential
inference "There exists a lost city of Atlantis," for Oedipus may be
looking, even if the thing he is looking for does not exist. So the
statement fails the test of existential generalization. Intensionality
is important for the subject of practical reason, because, among other
reasons, statements of reasons for action are typically
You might enjoy these:
Gottlob Frege, "Sinn und Bedeutung"
Per the indtroductory note by Max Black, Cornell University:
Sinn translates to "sense"
Bedeutung translates to "reference" [for the process] or "referent" [for the object].
Note also modern translations of "sinn" and "bedeutung" from German to English include:
"sinn" => sense, meaning, mind, point, feeling, signification, inclination...
"bedeutung" => importance, meaning, significance, concern, definition, prominence, weight, bearing, implication, et cetera.
Bertrand Russell, "On Denoting"
P.F. Strawson, "On Referring"
See here also for a decent overview of the "Semantic / Pragmatic" distinction:
"Pragmatics and Semantics" by Francois Recanati
If you are after an understanding of meaning, however, I suggest you read some Grice ("Meaning" as well as "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions") then consider what Professor Searle has to say in his article, "Grice On meaning: 50 Years Later", particularly:
"All the same, there is a difference between uttering the sentence and
meaning it and uttering it without meaning it.
In both cases, where I utter the sentence and mean it and I utter the
sentence without meaning it, there is an intentional act on my
part, the act of producing that utterance. The conditions of
satisfaction of the intention in both cases include the condition that
the intention itself should cause that utterance. I say “Il pleut” and
if I say it intentionally, then that utterance, the occurrence of that
very sequence of sounds, will be the condition of satisfaction of my
intention to make those sounds. The distinction between making the
sound intentionally, but without meaning it, and making the sound
intentionally and meaning that it is raining, is that in the second
case, the conditions of satisfaction of my intention are not only that
an utterance be produced, but the utterance itself now has further
conditions of satisfaction, in this case truth conditions to the
effect that it is raining. That may sound complicated, but the idea is
in fact very simple. The meaning intention consists in the intentional
imposition of conditions of satisfaction (in the sense of requirement)
on conditions of satisfaction (in the sense of things required)."
For example, if I am taking a shower and reciting French lessons repeating the phrase, "il pleut" this is not necessarily a comment upon micro-climate conditions. Likewise, if I am in despair and say, "Oh, why was I ever born?" offering upon an answer explaining why I was born is entirely beside the point of what was meant by the utterance. Lastly, if I say "I own this car" out of pride of ownership, rather than fact of it, demanding records in support of the claim is, again, irrelevant.
Hope that helps.