Ever since the "linguistic turn", philosophers have been keenly aware of the need of analyzing certain questions about language.
In retrospect, John Searle, in Expression and Meaning, notes "the philosophy of language is a branch of the philosophy of mind; therefore no theory of language is complete without an account of the relations between mind and language and of how meaning is grounded in the more biologically basic intrinsic intentionality of the mind/brain."
Searle seems to be saying this: talking about facts of language presupposes commitment to facts about the psychology of humans who are language users.
An argument for this conclusion could be along this thread:
1.) Words are used by a community of language users
2.) Words have determined meaningfulness in the community in which they are used
3.) Words, as physical sounds or written shapes, are not inherently meaningful
3.) If something linguistic determined the meaningfulness of words, then that linguistic item would be in need of determination, since it too would not be inherently meaningful
4.) On pain of an infinite regress, what gives words meaningfulness must be non-linguistic.
5.) Since words are meaningful only to the people who use them, the meaningfulness of our words is derived from the way we use them
6.) An account of this derivation relation must describe facts not only about word usage, which does not inform us as to how words can actually derive meaning, but about the people from which words derive their meaning.
7.) To understand facts about the people using language is to understand facts about human psychology, activity, and intention.
8.) A philosophy of language then, presupposes a philosophy of mind.
By 'presuppose' it isn't meant that every philosophy of language must include an account of the mind by a necessary law.
Instead, 'presuppose' means to describe this derivation relation, and the idea that a philosophy of language won't be comprehensive if it doesn't take account of facts about language users.
It is also to suggest that accounts that do not see a distinction between language and thought are not accounts in the philosophy of language, but rather the philosophy of mind.
Finally, if this argument is sound, it seems to establish that language use is not an autonomous activity, but is instead a mode of expression made possible because certain non-linguistic things operate in a certain way.