The SEP entry on perfect moral goodness states this argument against the possibility of a perfect moral goodness.
Necessarily, God actualizes some world
Necessarily, for each actualizable world w1, there is an actualizable world w2 such that from the moral point of view one would prefer w2 to w1
Necessarily, for whatever world that God actualizes, there is a morally better world that God does not actualize yet could have (from (2))
Necessarily, for whatever world that God actualizes, God's act of actualizing that world is not as morally good as some other act that God does not perform but could have (from (3))
Necessarily, for whatever world that God actualizes, God's agency is not as morally good as it could have been (from (4))
Necessarily, God's agency is not perfectly good (from (1), (5))
They seem to state the main discussion point is between (3) and (4), but I don't see why one must accept (2). What makes them think a best world isn't possible?