Carruthers (1998a,b, 2000) has argued to this effect based on his ‘higher-order thought’ theory, according to which, phenomenal consciousness requires the capacity to think about, and therefore conceptualize, one's own thoughts... other theorists such as Armstrong (1980), and Lycan (1996) have preferred a higher-order experience account, where consciousness is explained in terms of inner perception of mental states...
For me, introspection and capacity for thought seem binary, as qualia (that I am never any less acquainted with my actual mental states, and without the capacity to think I lose personal identity). But that qualia itself isn't binary: when e.g. I gradually fall into a deeper asleep...
One metaphysical question that is more directly relevant for the question of the phylogenetic distribution and evolution of consciousness is whether possessing it (i.e. being conscious) is binary (i.e. on/off, all-or-nothing), or admits of degrees. Several authors have, for quite different reasons, denied what they take to be a common but problematic assumption — that “Consciousness is an on/off switch; a system is either conscious or not,” as Searle — who endorses the thesis puts it (quoted by Lycan 1996, who denies the thesis).
Which would suggest, if the intuitions are right, anyway, that qualia, phenomenal consciousness, are neither just the capacity to think, nor just inner perception. The simplest resolution seems to be that we need the capacity to think about inner perception to have qualia.
So yeah, do we need a "theory of mind" for that?