I bolded and italicised this simile below.
Source: p. 46 Middle. Ethics: A Beginner's Guide (2015) by Peter Cave.
Slipping a tip: Kant thought moral duty must be carried out for its own sake; yet happiness, as the highest good, is deserved by those morally strong enough to perform their duties. Happiness depends on God's salvific will, on his grace. Schopenhauer quipped, 'That is akin to slipping a tip to a head- waiter when pretending to be above such things.'
Source: pp. 40 Bottom-41 Top. The Sense of the Past: Essays in the History of Philosophy by Bernard Williams.
[p. 40 Bottom]
For Plato, as also for Aristotle, it was a trivial truth that if it is rational for one to pursue a certain course of life or to be a certain sort of person, then those things must make for a satisfactory state of oneself called eudaimonia—a term which can only be translated as 'happiness'. But not everyone now will regard it as a triviality, or even as true, that it is only rational to do what in the end makes for one's own happiness. More- over, many people who do agree that that is true will not in fact be agreeing with the same thing as Plato and Aristotle meant. These facts are due not only to imperfections of that translation, but also to changes in views of life—changes which themselves have no doubt affected our understanding of the term 'happiness'. A proper charting of the complex relations of these words would involve a whole history of Western ethi- cal thought. What is certain is that eudaimonia did not necessarily imply the maximization of pleasure; and when Plato, supposedly having shown in the Republic that justice is the proper state of the soul, goes on to ar gue that the life of the just man is also a large number of times more
[p. 41 Top]
pleasant than that Of the unjust, this is meant to be an entirely additional consideration. It is in this respect much like Kant's assurance that virtue will be rewarded in an after-life, coming as that does after his insistence that it must be regarded as its own reward (a manoeuvre which Schopenhauer disobligingly compared to slipping a tip to a head-waiter who pre- tends to be above such things). The state of eudaimonia should be inter- preted as that of living as a man best could, and when one finds some Greek thinkers suggesting that one can attain eudaimonia although one is the victim Of torture, the linguistic strain that is undoubtedly set up ex- presses not just a semantic difficulty, but, under that, the substantial dif- ficulty of supposing that being tortured is compatible with living as one best could.