I wonder (once more) about Aristotle form and the relation between universal concept of color and nominalism of colored things, in the light of quantum mechanics.
Based on how we understand e.g. the electron, there is really not much of a structure of to describe. Electrons cannot themselves possess color for instance, since their change from one state to another within the atom is the process which creates light.
This implies that the color yellow is the light of a certain wavelength emitted when the electron jumps within an atom (or collide with another subatomic particle) and yellow things are things which consist of such atoms. Light can be created in other ways too, but none can be used to illuminate an electron, and there are corresponding explanations for things with looks yellow for other reasons, i.e. a similar argument as above can be applied to other types of light, both in connection with emitting and absorbing light, and both for reflective surfaces and body color.
There doesn´t seem to be any form left to describe on the microscopic level, and it is difficult to see any difference between an electron generating light in general and a certain electron generating light.
This viewpoint seems to agree with Aristotle in the sense that the universal color are “identical in each of its instances “as pointed out in Wikipedia (Aristotle’s theory of universals).
In other words, do quantum mechanics or - more generally - a microscopic description deconstruct the Aristotle form and the difference between universalism and nominalism, i.e. make them trivially identical?