Are there counter examples to Kant's perfect duties?

Question

Are there exceptions to Kant's perfect duties - duties always or never to do X? By this I mean, does the doctrine of perfect duties generate counter-examples - situations in which if we followed the requirement always or never to do X then what we would do or not do would be repugnant to ordinary moral thinking - a standard to which Kant adheres ? Does one really have a duty never to make a lying promise whatever the circumstances?

I personally like the idea that what we have perfect duties to acquire and exercise character traits such as generosity and benovolence, because it seems reasonably intuitive to say that we should never have a deceitful character nor a competitive attitude, but that honest people can still lie. Alongside the imperfect duty to e.g. give to charity, like Kantians suggest.

Does or could Kant accept the idea of a perfect duty to acquire and exercise character traits and not, or in addition to, a duty always or never to do a certain type of action ?

Answer 1

I personally like the idea that what we have perfect duties to acquire and exercise character traits such as generosity and benovolence, because it seems reasonably intuitive to say that we should never have a deceitful character nor a competitive attitude, but that honest people can still lie. Alongside the imperfect duty to e.g. give to charity, like Kantians suggest.

What you are describing is usually called virtue ethics and is distinguished from both deontology (incl. Kantian ethics) and consequentialism (incl. utilitarianism). This distinction is somewhat artificial because virtue ethics has some elements common to both consequentialism and deontology. The history of these movements is actually quite complicated, and Kant himself wrote a great deal about virtue in his Doctrine of Virtue.

Kant likes virtues mainly because they make it easier for you to follow the categorical imperative (as a sort of "moral strength"), and not because they have any independent value. Virtue ethics takes the opposite approach, holding virtues to be fundamental and deriving moral duties from them.

Does or could Kant accept the idea of a perfect duty to acquire and exercise character traits and not, or in addition to, a duty always or never to do a certain type of action ?

No, because Kantian ethics isn't primarily about character traits. It's about duty and actions. Kant does espouse the idea that acquiring virtuous character traits is an imperfect duty, because it makes us better at fulfilling other duties. But virtue does not take supremacy over other duties, because the whole point of virtue is to better fulfill those duties. To the extent that a virtue contradicts the categorical imperative, Kant would likely hold that it is not the true virtue.

Does one really have a duty never to make a lying promise whatever the circumstances?

According to Kant, yes. To do otherwise would violate the categorical imperative.

Answer 2

From the Groundwork section 2, emphasis mine:

[C]ondescension to popular concepts is certainly very commendable if the elevation to the principles of pure reason has already happened and been achieved to complete satisfaction; and that would mean first founding the doctrine of morals on metaphysics and, when it has been established, afterwards obtaining access for it by means of popularity. But it is without rhyme or reason to want to comply with it in the first investigation, on which all correctness of principles depends... It is clear from what has been said that all moral concepts have their seat and origin completely a priori in reason...

The best response to a "counterexample" to Kant is, "So what?"

Providing counterexamples completely misses the point. Kant's task is to start essentially at the beginning, by analyzing the pure concepts of morality, duty, freedom, etc, and to see what he can make with them. While we would of course like to have the results of this investigation match up with our every moral intuition, we cannot possibly require this. Then we would be stipulating the correctness of our intuition, something which we have no justification for.

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A small note: All of that is seperate from the morality of any given action, but I find most of the really repugnant conclusions stem from a misunderstanding, or an artificially constrained set of options.

• While you can't lie to a murderer, you can very easily refuse to answer. And if you are being tortured, and so forced to answer, would anyone really blame you for breaking?

• Of course you can try to win a game of chess. You shouldn't play someone at chess simply to win, but rather because you want to have an enjoyable experience with them. And you're not contradicting their rational will by struggling with them for victory, because they do not in fact have a will but rather a wish to win. Winning a game of chess is not completely in our control, but rather relies at least in part on the actions of another, so while we can desire it, we cannot will it in the same way we would, say, will that we stand up.