The reason I ask is because of the ambiguity of some statements when the conditionals of a condition are not referenced by tense i.e time. For example, in the Cognito Ergo Sum 'I think therefore I am', it could be read as saying that thinking causing existence, which is obviously not the case.
Let my elucidate the problem, as you'll be well aware, this is an instance of Modus Ponens, which can broken down as such:
p q p > q p ______ q
This is usually thought of as p being a sufficient cause, which necessitates an effect, in the case of the Cogito Ergo Sum, this would mean thinking causes existence. However, it could also mean that p is sufficient evidence of a necessary cause, in the case of the Cogito Ergo Sum, this would mean that thinking is sufficient evidence for the necessity of one's existence, which of course is Descartes intent in his assertion. So it's not that a given cause (thinking) is sufficient for the necessary outcome for one's existence (the effect), but that thinking (the outcome) is a sufficient effect which can be adduced to a necessary cause – existence.
It's not just grand assertions like the Cogito Ergo Sum, however, that is prone to such ambiguity. Afterall, one may consider that given such a fundamental assertion, it may not be the best example. Consider then the assertion: 'if there is rain, then there are clouds'. Certainly one has never seen the pour of rain from a cloudless sky, so we can say this is true with great confidence. However, if a blind man was told that 'if it is raining, then there are clouds' (and was never taught the cause-effect relationship of clouds and rain) he would be as justified to presume (though wrong) in saying that rain causes clouds.