Keep in mind that Searle's "Chinese Room Argument" is a refutation of the computational theory of mind and not a refutation of the possibility of machine learning or non-biological consciousness (as it is often mis-read that way). Nor is Searle's theory positing that the computer is not a useful metaphor for consciousness or tool for examining consciousness - both, however, have their limits. What Searle is doing with the Chinese Room argument is showing the limits of syntactical manipulation to achieve semantic content. His aim in doing so is to explain and one day demonstrate how to get from "the physics" to "the semantics."
If a computer is fed with bunch of data that it actually learns or correctly answers untaught problem, is it not being intelligent?
Doesn't your question presume the consequent? If a computer actually learns, i.e. demonstrates intelligence, then yes, the computer demonstrates intelligence but you are presuming that the computer actually learns.
Clarification is needed as to what it would mean for a computer to actually learn in something other than a jejune sense of actual learning. I.e. you could say that the computer has "actually learned arithmetic" after I enter numbers into the computer and it returns their sum, however, after entering into the computer data for the values of two and three as well as programming the means by which to concatenate numerical values, when I then instruct the computer to return their sum (i.e. ask it "what is two plus three?") and the number 5 is printed to the screen - this is not evidence that the computer has learned anything at all. Note here that the computer does not know how to answer "what is two plus three?" it merely operates upon the symbols for 2, 3, and + such that 5 is returned.
In the case of what computers (i.e. Turing machines) are actually doing, they are only literally learning in the sense that "literal" is used to mean "metaphorical" or "figurative" and not actual. To the point tho, what is meant here by your question: "is [the computer] not being intelligent?" - "intelligent" according to whom? "Learn" according to whom?
While the field of machine learning has made impressive advances with what can be called learning (see the work of Jürgen Schmidhuber), this kind of machine learning is distinct from the first-person subjective ontology of biological learning - whether human or some other animal.
For example, in computation what are called "neuronal networks" are an analog of how we can usefully model what is happening in the brain (and presumably causing consciousness). A metaphor, however, is all it is. We simply do not know enough about the physical processes in the brain and the body which cause consciousness to simulate anything other than artificial intelligence - "weak AI" in Searle's parlance (something he is not arguing against)
Lastly, to address your question so that you may formulate one which has heuristic and not merely interpretive value, consider as well in which sense do you mean "intelligent"? Or "Artificially intelligent"?
From "Brain, Mind, and Consciousness: A Conversation with Philosopher John Searle" March 3, 2015 by Dan Turello
The expression “Artificial Intelligence” is multiply ambiguous, and it is unfortunate that this ambiguity has not been sorted out. An artificial x can be either a real x produced artificially or a fake x. For example, artificial dyes are real dyes produced artificially, it is just they are not produced from vegetables. Artificial cream, on the other hand, is not real cream but fake cream. So “Artificial Intelligence” can mean either something that is not intelligent and is produced artificially, or it can mean something that is actually intelligent produced artificially. “Intelligence” is also ambiguous because it is ambiguous between real, honest to John observer-independent intelligence – as, for example, when a human being is thinking about something – and the observer-relative, derivative, metaphorical sense of intelligence – for instance, when we speak of my pocket calculator or computer as displaying intelligence. This is unfortunate because in the sense in which humans have real observer-independent intelligence, commercial computers have nothing like that. The sense in which the computer is intelligent is entirely observer relative or metaphorical. The reason the “intelligence” of the commercial computer is entirely observer relative is that we do not know how to make a conscious computer. Existing computers work entirely by having complex electronic circuits, and what we think of as “computation” is a series of programmed transitions between the states of the complex electrical circuitry.
As to whether or not machines will be conscious, it is important to remember that we are machines. We are biological machines and we are conscious. I do not see any reason, in principle, why we could not build an artificial machine that was conscious, but we are unable to do that now because we do not know how the brain does it. The question, “Can you build an artificial machine that is conscious?” is just like the question “Can you build an artificial heart that pumps blood?” We know how to build artificial hearts because we know how the biological heart works. We do not know how to build an artificial brain because we do not know how the brain works. But assuming we knew how the brain worked, I see no obstacle in principle to building an artificial conscious machine. The important thing to see is that the human brain is a machine, a biological machine, and it produces consciousness by biological processes. We will not be able to do that artificially until we know how the brain does it and we can then duplicate the causal powers of the brain. Perhaps we can do it in some completely different medium as we build artificial hearts in a completely different medium from muscle tissue, but at present we do not know enough about the brain to build an artificial brain.