Is it OK to argue that what is hugely more likely to occur is in fact the case?
There seems to be a class of paradox that relies on the idea that what we think is the case is in fact much much less likely to occur by chance than some other scenario, usually highly counter-intuitive, the suggestion being that we should reject the former is in fact the case. e.g. Boltzmann brains:
The paradox states that if one considers the probability of our current situation as self-aware entities embedded in an organized environment versus the probability of stand-alone self-aware entities existing in a featureless thermodynamic "soup", then the latter should be vastly more probable than the former.
Another example may be the idea, and I'm sorry but I forgot who to cite, that we're not alive for so much of the existence of the universe, reality, that it makes no sense, and the odds are we alive for more of it than we think.
Or perhaps the idea that the universe or multiverse is so huge that the odds are that our minds will repeat or re-occur someplace else.
Is this a class of paradox?