This is an interesting question, but it has so many layers that it is hard to answer it well.
First, the question itself asks "is X blameworthy?" And this implies that there is a category of moral blame. This implies a moral theory where there are epistemic requirements for moral agency. The first article that comes to mind here is GEM Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy", and the idea is that on a neo-Aristotelian picture wrong is often identical with blameworthy. Conversely, excellence is praise-worthy.
These aspects don't hinge on whether people do praise or blame you but only on whether considered by the man of practical wisdom (phronemos), they would be blameworthy or praiseworthy. On such a picture, willful ignorance is clearly not praise-worthy.
Stated in more broadly Aristotelian terms, to do right is to use our nature to its maximum capacity and to do wrong is to abuse our nature. Clearly, reasoning incorrectly can be an instance of this.
But this account's focus on blame will wipe out two of the more common contenders for moral theory of the century: utilitarianism (and its kin) and Kantianism. So Let's put this aside and change your question to "is it morally wrong not to know something?"
You're also asking about ignorance. Here, you are asking is ignorance ever wrong? And the answer for all types of theories is yes. One of the more elaborate accounts of this happens in Augustine's considerations of moral ignorance. And in fact, this helps to create part of why we haven't followed the Aristotelian model of blame and praise.
On Augustine's account, we can be held responsible for sinning even if we did not know, because we failed in our duty to know things like the law. Building on Plato, he works out a system that is reflected in the Western legal system: ignorance of the law is no excuse. (an idea also worked out in Stoicism).
You also mention "morality" which brings to mind Kant. There's actually a pretty clear line in Kant's thought that we are in the wrong if we lie to ourselves. For Kant, this is to not treat oneself as a rational being (MPV - don't have the page number off the top of my head). But I don't think we are responsible on the Kantian picture for mere factual ignorance.
For contemporary literature, that's a bit away from what I work on, but I think McDowell might have something if you are looking for this in the Aristotelian vein. Otherwise, I might suggest the virtue epistemologists (Ernest Sosa, John Greco, Robert Roberts, and others) who are going to be working on the intersection of morality and epistemology. But if you are trying to avoid virtue ethics as the approach here, I'm not sure who to suggest.