In the discussion about free will, moral realism and libertarianism go hand in hand.
It seems that libertarian free will is assumed to be what we need to “attach” moral responsibility to certain actions. And this is also one of the major critiques of compatibilism, that it just doesn't seem to allow for moral responsibility.
As Nietzsche puts it succinctly:
Men were considered "free" only so that they might be considered guilty – could be judged and punished: consequently, every act had to be considered as willed, and the origin of every act had to be considered as lying within the consciousness (and thus the most fundamental psychological deception was made the principle of psychology itself).
If an all-knowing, “all-honest” being told us that we have libertarian free will and moral anti-realism is true, how can we make sense of it? Could we ever?
Is there any way to better nail down, what libertarianism means – something more illuminating than the standard definition “libertarianism: indeterminism is true and necessary for free will and we also have free will” – which does not assume moral realism? Has there ever been a libertarian moral anti-realist philosopher?