If Christian ethics are poison to Nietzsche's higher types -- what about conventional aesthetics, is that a poison to them? Eliot, writing in 1928 (in the preface to the 2nd edition of The Scared Wood), claims that
poetry as [sic] certainly has something to do with morals, and with religion, and even with politics perhaps, though we cannot to say what
Auden, before moving to America in 1939 (when commonly thought to enter a new phase of his writing) claimed that the essential tension, in poetry, was the that between "moral seriousness" and amoral "poetic artifice" (see the beginning of Auden's Poetic Art), and "never gave up" moral education as an impulse toward his art.
So that's two important writers who link poetry and morality, and after the great "anti-social" (Peter Nicholls -- Modernisms: a literary guide) French poets of the 19th century.
As the SEP points out, concerning Kant
some commentators take the demand for universal validity made by a judgment of beauty to amount to a moral demand, so that Kant's argument for the universal validity of such judgments depends on an appeal to morality. A more common view, however, is to see judgments of beauty not as grounded in morality, but rather, along with judgments of the sublime, as contributing to an account of moral feeling, and hence of how morality is possible for human beings
So I got wondering how the relation between morality and aesthetics plays out in interpretations of Nietzsche -- whose ideal has been described as "the artist tyrant" (Will to Power, 504). Specifically, can aesthetics be poison to Nietzsche's higher types, like Christian morality is, it seems?