I think that it should be possible to assign to all concepts a plausible intension, consisting of just one or two words. However, in textbooks or encyclopedias I never found such focused appointments of intensions. Or does somebody know such a book? – Hence, I started to formulate and collect such appointments of intensions for various concepts.
One example was, that the intension of “argumentation” is “explanation” (why one thinks, or purports, at all something that one thinks). When I continued my reflections, the following problem arouse: The intension of an appropriate explanation seems to be the “formulation of intensions (and/or intentions*) of the relating situations/themes”.
But, isn’t it true that the conclusion from this must be that the intension of the intension may be identified with “explanation”?
Why? Because: I of E is I ==> I of I is E (as explained above). Or is there some flaw in my consideration?
*) As explained here, in my answer, I consider intension and intention to be exactly the same.
I and E are not variables, but just abbreviations of Intension and Explanation.