The Two concepts are different and to a believer's mind they create different domains and are not compatible.
Here I just present the two understanding and a comparison can be made to clear the dilemma.
The divine providence-
The hallmark of the traditional free will defense is its fastidiousness: it seeks to distance God from as much evil as possible so that his goodness will not be tainted by it.
The God of the Judeo-Christian and Islamic traditions are not so fastidious. He is active in all our deeds, turning our hearts where he wills (Prov. 21:1), and working in us to will and to do as he pleases. Part of his purpose in this, the tradition holds, is that we be creatures with the moral authenticity that can only come with free will.
The inevitable accompaniment, however, is that we sin. God does not will this for its own sake, but if God’s providence is complete he does will for us the independence that amounts to our rebellion, for it is indispensable to his purpose. The question the tradition faces is whether God’s providence can be complete here,
whether he can have full sovereignty if we are truly free.
The second focus of concern is the fact of suffering, which also falls under God’s will.
According to theodicies that emphasize soul-making and defeasibility, this is not because God is malevolent, but so that we can share with him the knowledge that evil is creation’s enemy, and partake in the glory of its defeat.
The scriptural God evinces no fear that he will be tainted by any of this, nor does he distance himself from evil in any way.
On the contrary: even after Adam’s sin God remains fully engaged with humankind, sparing no effort to secure our rescue, and treating our suffering with healing concern and compassion.
In the Christian tradition, he is even willing to send his son to bear our sorrows with us and to be sacrificed so that we may again find acceptance with God in repentance.
The fallenness of creation is not, then, an object of heavenly disdain, and for defenders of divine providence, it is not cause for philosophical disappointment. Rather, they hold, the task of overcoming evil is central to the creative enterprise.
We sin and suffer because God is out to defeat sin and suffering and to see that all who are ordained to share in the victory do so.
The theist is forced to admit, however, that we do not always understand in detail how this occurs, and some sort of appeal to the mystery may, in fact, be necessary. In that respect, at least, any theodicy has to be incomplete.
Some philosophers, notably Luis de Molina (1535–1600) and Alvin Plantinga, have held that God knows not only what actual people will freely do in the future, but what each possible free creature would have freely done in each set of possible circumstances, if fully specific;
and that he had this knowledge at the creation. (An action is free in the required sense if not causally determined and not predetermined by God.)
Propositions about what a creature would do in a set of circumstances (possible as well as actual) are commonly called “counterfactuals of freedom”, and God's knowledge of them is called “middle knowledge”. (Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge (Part IV of the Concordia); Plantinga 1974, IX))
If God's knowledge of actual future actions would constitute a fatalistic threat, his middle knowledge could not be less threatening, since, given middle knowledge, he would have knowledge of actual actions on the basis of his knowledge of the circumstances.
In fact it seems that it is more threatening.
Of course, one way of avoiding the threat would be to deny that there are in general any facts about what people would have freely done in circumstances that have not actually arisen; there may be facts about what they might have done, or what they would very probably have done; but not what they would have done. (Adams 1977; Hasker 1989, 20–9)
Indeed this seems to be quite plausible if we really think of people's actions as undetermined.
It may help us to see this if we consider the tossing of a coin. Let us suppose that a coin is tossed on some occasion, and it comes down heads, and suppose we then ask if it would have come down heads again if we had tossed it again in exactly the same circumstances. It seems plausible if we think that how it landed was undetermined, that the right answer is that it might have come down heads and it might have come down tails, but that it is not the case that it would have come down heads, nor the case that it would have come down tails.
So one solution to the fatalistic threat posed by middle knowledge is akin to the Aristotelian solution. Since there are no facts of the relevant sort, God cannot have knowledge of them. But, because there are no such facts, God's lack of knowledge of how free creatures would freely act is no bar to his omniscience.
Are there any other solutions?
It is difficult to see how there could be. In the case of actual actions, the solutions depended on suggesting ways in which it might have been possible for Jones to do something which would bring it about that some fact about God was different; that is to say that they depended on showing how some fact about God might be dependent on what Jones did.
Now in the case of middle knowledge, we know how such a dependence would have to operate; it would have to operate by way of God's knowledge of counterfactuals of freedom.
So, could the truth of counterfactuals of freedom related to Jones be dependent on Jones's actions?
It seems that they could not be, because the facts that make them true were available to God at the creation before he had decided to create anything, let alone
So the facts, like God's decision, must have been ontologically prior, it seems, to any act of Jones's. So it seems that it could not be in Jones's power so to act that any actually true counterfactual of freedom relating to him would not have been true. (Hasker 1989, 39–52; see Hasker et al. 2000 for a collection of writings on middle knowledge.)