Ludwig Wittgenstein discusses at length the argument against the coherence of a private language throughout his published works. My question is, are there any objections to the argument that work properly? I have read the SEP entry and while the objections are listed, it seems that there is no discussion of the effectiveness of said objections. The one objection I have interest in for the purpose of this question is, quoting Solomon Radley's blog:
"Ostensive definition does not fix meanings by associating things Wittgenstein insists that every genuine symbol must have a meaning that persists over time. He then notices a problem with private language sensations themselves are occurent, and eventually cease to be. But it might be responded that it’s mistaken for him to go on to argue that the private linguist needs something else (an image of the sensation) to permanently accompany ‘S’ in order for it to have a permanent meaning. All that’s necessary is a permanent possibility – the possibility of linking S with the same sensation. An enduring image of this sensation is no more necessary for guaranteeing the meaning of S than is a sample of sepia preserved in a glass case for guaranteeing the meaning of the word ‘sepia’."
Does the aforementioned objection succeed in derailing the private language argument?