A colleague and I were discussing literary deconsructionism, to which he was very much opposed on the grounds that the author had not freely given their work to the public and so what they intended it to mean is something we should be invested in. It gave rise to the question of whether this had ever been applied to philosophical texts where, one might argue, the exact opposite was the case (i.e. the idea is what we're invested in, not the person), but on asking around we could not come up with a single example of this approach. A brief search of this site found nothing, but on the other side of the argument found dozens of questions of the form "What did X mean by ..."
I'm not here referring to the deconstructionism of the likes of Derrida, where the subtext is a truth even if unintended, but specifically of the literary kind, where the possible interpretations of the text are as valid as the author's actual intent.
To clarify some terminology in the light of comments, from "A Glossary of Literary Terms"
New critical explications of texts had undertaken to show that a great literary work, in the tight internal relations of its figurative and paradoxical meanings, constitutes a freestanding, bounded and organic entity of multiplex yet determinate meanings. On the contrary, a radically deconstructive close reading undertakes to show that a literary text lacks a "totalized" boundary that makes it an entity, much less an organic unity; also that the text, by a play of internal counter-forces, disseminates into an indefinite range of self-conflicting significations.
and Atkins writes in his literary deconstruction of Shakespeare;
there is no single deconstructive "party line" represented.
Hopefully that will serve to clarify the two lines of confusion - How deconstructionism differs from New Criticism and how later literary uses differ from the analysis of Derrida.
So what I'm asking about is any interpretations of philosophical texts which (in the same way deconstructionist literary criticism might derive new metaphors), derive new philosophical statements from the conflicting or contradictory themes the authors themselves do not necessarily intend to be there, but which are not themselves intended to be truths, merely alternatives.