My question relates to the relationship between Kant's logic and predicate logic.
My intuition is that Kant's notion that some ideas transcend the bounds of logic, is evidence for the insufficiency of predicate logic as compared with propositional logic.
For example, our idea of the world, is something Wittgenstein engaged with - saying it does not make sense to make metaphysical propositions about the character of metaphysical reality, since "the world" can be thought of as "all that is the case" and in order to describe the limits of logical form, we would need to be able to step outside the bounds of logical form. Kant's "transcendental logic" may have attempted to reach the same kind of harmony/synthesis about metaphysical propositions as Wittgenstein at the end of his Tractatus, yet with the difference that Wittgenstein said that attempts to give content to analytical propositions about logic were necessarily void of meaningful content, whereas Kant seems to have thought you could meaningfully systemise this new logic - with terms like the synthetic a priori.
What do you think?
