You might find what Aristotle said about this question in his Physics over two millenia ago; he begins first by identifying contraries as principles if nature (ie as laws of nature), in Greek arche:
(188a19 - 189a10)
All thinkers then agree in making the contraries principles; both those who describe the All as one and unmoved (for even Parmenides treats hold and cold as principles under the name earth and fire) and those who use the rare and dense. The same is true of Democritus also, of his plenum and void; both of which he says exist, the one as being, and the other as non-being. Again, he speaks of differences of position, shape and order; and these are genera, of which the species are contraries; of position, above and below, before and behind; of shape, angular and angle-less, roundness and straightness.
He describes principles discursively as:
for first principles must not be derived from each other, nor from anything else; while everything must be derived from them.
but these condition are fulfilled by the primary contraries; which are not derived from anything because they are primary; nor from each other because they are contraries.
His presupposes that
in nature, nothing acts on or is acted upon by any other thing at random, nor can anything come from anything else
Eveything that comes to be by a natural process is either a contrary or a product of contraries.
He then asks, as you do:
the next question is whether the principles are two, three or more in number.
one they cannot be, for there cannot be one contrary
He offers no argument for, at least at this point of the text; and then
nor can they be in-numerable [ie infinite in number] because if so Being would be unknowable.
Hence he presupposes that Being must be of such a nature that it must be knowable; and also
granted then, that there is a finite number, it is plausible to suppose them more than two in number; for it is difficult to see how density should be of such a nature as to act on rarity, or rarity on density; the same is true of any other contrary ... both act on a third thing different from either.
Interestingly he clarifies the notion of a principle further in terms of his logic
what is a principle ought not to be the predicate of any subject; if it were, there would be a principle of the supposed principle; for the subject is principle, and prior, presumably, to anything predicated of it.
He then adds
All, however agree in this, that they differentiate their one by means of contraries such as density and rarity, or more and less; which may be generalised, as already been said, into excess and defect; indeed, this doctrine (that the one and excess and defect are the principle of things) would appear to be of old standing ... for the early thinkers made the two the active principle, and the one the passive; whereas some of the more recent maintain the reverse.
(Interestingly he does not say how old this theory is; after all, in his time, Parmenides was around two generations ago, so not much more than a century from his writing this); so he concludes:
to suppose then that the elements are three in number would seem, from these and similar considerations, a plausible view ... it is clear then that the number of elements is neither one nor more than two or three; but whether it is two or three is, as I have said, a question of considerable difficulty.