From what I've gathered, reliabilism states that epistemic justification occurs when someone forms a belief via truth-conducive methods. However, doesn't this fall to the problem of induction? Isn't reliabilism assuming that truth-conducive methods, or methods that have produced true beliefs in the past, will persist to be truth-conducive?

  • See book, Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge, its Scope and Limits, Routledge (1948) (1992). Masterful treatment of the question. – Gordon Aug 29 '17 at 11:37
  • See also book, Nicholas Maxwell, From knowledge to wisdom : a revolution in the aims and methods of science, B. Blackwell (1984). Be patient at the begining, it gets better as it goes along. – Gordon Aug 29 '17 at 11:42

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