Since its truth value depends on the personal opinions and so it can not be a logical statement( therefore different persons give different truth values based on their opinions. ) Please give a clear answer.
There are some layers of confusion in this question, so (despite the request) the answer isn't exactly simple.
Given the context provided in the question, a "logical statement" is taken to mean an assertoric sentence that may be assigned a truth value. And I'm guessing that the asker also wants this to be done in classical logic, so only "true" and "false" are truth values.
The confusion that many people make is to assume that truth values (in a logic) inherently have something to do with a theory of truth. That's actually not the case.
Truth values evidently have something to do with a general concept of truth. Therefore it may seem rather tempting to try to incorporate considerations on truth values into the broader context of traditional truth-theories, such as correspondence, coherence, anti-realistic, or pragmatist conceptions of truth. Yet, it is unlikely that such attempts can give rise to any considerable success. Indeed, the immense fruitfulness of Frege’s introduction of truth values into logic to a large extent is just due to its philosophical neutrality with respect to theories of truth. It does not commit one to any specific metaphysical doctrine of truth.
(Although Frege may himself not have fully realized the impact of his innovation at the time, as he only considered two truth values.)
So whether you hold or not that "truth is subjective" (that is a theory of truth) surprisingly/actually has nothing to do with whether the sentence "God exist" fits the bill to be assigned some truth value in some logic, which may actually be even classical logic. But this is merely a formal observation.
What you're probably referring to here (on the subjective angle) is the empirical or even knowability status of "God exists".
Even assuming the notion of "God" is universally defined with a fixed or at least sufficiently similar meaning between speakers, so all speakers mean [roughly] the same thing when they utter "God exists", obviously there are varying views on the matter, to the extent that some express theirs as a probability or at least more informally as a "leaning". (You could roughly consider this a non-binary truth value assignment.)
Furthermore, one has to be careful in reading such statements from a semantics perspective. There's implicature in that (bare) statement "God exists"; various speakers may mean slightly or even substantially different things by "God". E.g. one speaker holding an inerrancy view of the Christian bible would mean one thing by "God", but someone holding the view that the laws of the universe as we know them are God obviously means a different thing by the same two-word utterance. (And I'm vastly over-simplifying the spectrum of semantic positions here; philosophers have written a lot about the supposed nature of God.)
So, in summary, yes "God exists" is a "logical statement" from the point of view of formal logic... but that doesn't entail or explain anything substantial about the existence of God as an empirical question.