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How is consciousness distinguished from things? If one, f.i., sees a watch on a wrist of a sumptuous arm, gleaming in the recesses of a dark restaurant, what is not supposed to be included in the "seeing", that is, so to say, left over, that is the "object"?

Do people when they speak of "consciousness" mean something like solipsism? Or, do they distinguish it from something else, such as a measurable object, which accords with a science of objectified objects? I really don't understand why one claims so-called consciousness is something obvious. As though we all know what we mean by it, and the problem is linking it to "something". What is this "something"?

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    Physiology makes it clear that it's not possible for us to experience objects directly. Our nerves don't send images of the world to the brain; they just send electrical signals, so we experience objects indirectly by means of consciousness. Without it, the mind would be a very dark and silent place. So if you find anything at all obvious, there's nothing else that it could be except for consciousness. That's what experience consists of. – user3017 Sep 27 '17 at 1:04
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    It is common to make a distinction between awareness and consciousness, since what we mean by the latter is usually intentional consciousness. The method for separating awareness from consciousness of objects and subjects is called Yoga. – user20253 Sep 27 '17 at 9:10
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    @John Forkosh - Not a neophyte question at all. Awareness of awareness would be a good description. This would be consciousness beyond time and space, the 'I Am' of the Old Testament, consciousness without objects or subjects. 'Scientific' consciousness studies suffers from only studying intentional consciousness and this leads to a muddle. The 'something' that you conjecture is left over when objects and subjects are absent is what Schopenhauer calls his 'better consciousness'. This is a phenomenon you could explore for yourself if you choose to attempt it but it takes some practice. – user20253 Sep 27 '17 at 12:59
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    "sounds like you are trying to do phenomenology" but why is "consciousness" not phenomenology? Because of a unfoundable metaphysical claim about a "real" brain? Or, somehow, through the sheer indifference of idiocy? – Gonçalo Mabunda Sep 27 '17 at 22:05
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    "The 'something' that you conjecture is left over when objects and subjects are absent is what Schopenhauer calls his 'better consciousness'" I don't mean that at all. Rather, Why is the conception of "consciousness" not Phenomenology? is asked. I think it is sheer idiocy in philosophy. Lack of philosophic sense. Though, it is very worth thinking the captivation in the phenomena beside the active knowing of a Husserl. – Gonçalo Mabunda Sep 27 '17 at 22:19

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