Is Kant's ethical theory adequate to the complexities of universalisation?

Question

Kant argues that one should only act according to those principles which can be universalised. However human actions are often complex and motivated by multi-layered reasonings. They can rarely be distilled down to a simple one-sentence principle.

So when Kant does just that, how is he not committing a fallacy?

For example I may reason that it is ok to lie to a murderer however Kant would argue that I believe it is ok to lie in general and use that as my principle in order to drive a contradiction But I do not condone lying in general, so how is this not a fallacy?

Answer 1

In the original question, this was specifically about a "strawman fallacy" which I don't think is the right term. As modified and then answered by Geoffrey Thomas, I think this get's closer to a common objection to Kant that Kant scholars have had to grapple with.

In it's current form, the first paragraph states,

Kant argues that one should only act according to those principles which can be universalised. However human actions are often complex and motivated by multi-layered reasonings. They can rarely be distilled down to a simple one-sentence principle.

The first sentence is just simply what is meant by the universalization formulation of the Categorical Imperative. You can find it in the Groundwork and elsewhere.

The second and third sentences raise a claim that is somewhat debatable, because much hinges on how we describe human actions. Just to illustrate, Utilitarians are not committed to this since they think people act for pleasure (which need not be complex). Aristotelians and virtue ethicists tend to have a complex picture of action.

A second issue is whether we should understand actions in terms of motivations. The other option is to understand them in terms of reasons. The motivation picture is more Humean than Kantian (see Marcia Baron, Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology and Christine Korsgaard).

The relationship between these ideas is complex, but it seems like Kant believes it is possible to have a moral action which finds its origin in the will acting in accordance with reason. (This can be accompanied but not caused by a feeling or subjective motivation for Kant).

If this is what the objection is getting at, then it may be the case that the OP and Kant just have different ideas about what action is.

The second paragraph, however, highlights a real problem in Kant's philosophy. Kant never really gives us a clear explanation of what a "maxim" is or how it relates to one's action and how it becomes universal. Consequently, it is a real question whether we can pick the descriptions of the actions we undertake.

Allen Wood, Henry Allison, and Thomas Hill (inter alia) have all worked on this problem. My memory may be a little fuzzy here but the parts that I found convincing in this account are :

You cannot maxim shop -- it is not a question of picking a maxim that could explain your action and be universalizabe. It's a legitimate question of what you wanted to do when you acted. This seems pretty convincing to me, because maxims are not alibis; they are descriptions of the structure behind your actions.

Actions do admit some multiple descriptions the same action could be described in multiple ways. Kant admits the same in the quodlibetal questions that follow each section of the Metaphysics of Morals: Doctrine of Virtue.

Here, we have Kant saying that banter that includes untruths like "that's a splendid dress" or "of course you look fine" are not lies. Or similarly that willing that you die to protect others is not suicide. Or that killing in war is not murder.

The danger is that once you open the door to these sorts of re-descriptions, it's not clear how you justify some and not others. In my view, Kant does not have great resources for defending the quodlibetal questions. This is a central part of Hegel's critique of Kant (in Natural Law, again in Phenomenology of Spirit, again in Philosophy of Right) -- that "pure reason" alone is not adequate to create descriptions of real human situations and that we need societal knowledge to bridge the gap.

Many contemporary Kantians agree. Some of them argue that Kant was already saying this (Korsgaard, Rawls, Nancy Sherman, Thomas Hill, and Allen Wood -- who interestingly says this in conversion from the Hegelian position). Others admit Kant did not say this but don't care (Habermas).

To recap, there's two issues going on here:

1. Kant's theory of action vs. a common contemporary one.
2. The problem of "maxim shopping" with the partial response -- it's the reasons for which we actually undertake our actions plus the problem of description.

Answer 2

You raise an important point. It is reasonable to suppose that any action has a variety of descriptions. If I turn on the light in a room (1) I move my hand, (2) I activate an electrical current, (3) I illuminate the room, (4) I alert a burglar ... All these are perfectly proper descriptions of what I do.

This translates straight across to morality. If I deliberately tell an untruth, (1) I lie, (2) I save someone's hurt feelings, (3) I keep a promise of secrecy, (4) I withhold information about myself that someone has no right to know. All of these can properly describe my action - depending of course on the circumstances.

Kant never explains why just one of these descriptions, 'I lie', should be the dominant description, the one to which I apply the universalisability test.

One might say that Kant commits a fallacy in the very loose sense that he infers from his ethical theory that 'I lie' is the dominant description when this doesn't logically follow from his theory. But I would prefer to say just that he opts for one description of an action and decides, without solid justification, that, no question about it, this is the description to which the universalisability test applies.

It is fair to point out that in the 'Metaphysics of Morals', as distinct from the 'Groundwork', Kant shows himself to be sensitive (at least moderately) to the alternative descriptions under which an action can be morally assessed.

Answer 3

Kant's Categorical Imperative relies on what is logically possible. Even if we take your position that it is only okay to lie to a murderer (and not at any other time), Kant can still construct a logical contradiction. Namely:

Assume everyone lies to murderers. Therefore, everyone would know that anything said to a murderer is false. As a result, the information that one might wish to conceal by lying is laid bare because it is simply the opposite of what was said. Therefore, your statement is no longer a lie since the conveyed meaning of the statement within its linguistic and social context is in fact a truth. This is a contradiction because we assumed that the statement was a lie.

At this point, your more subtle argument comes into play. "There are many ways to lie," you might say, "Therfore, there is no way to discern the truth merely from the knowledge that the statement is untrue." This is analogous to your position that motivations are complex and that context matters. Maybe it can be okay to lie in some situations (or to some questions) but not in others.

The answer to this criticism is that not every situation that is willed universally must create a logical contradiction. As long as any do (such as being asked a strictly yes-or-no question by the murderer), then it is disallowed. Therfore, it is not a straw man fallacy because it is more nuanced and flexible then you are giving it credit for. It was actually designed to accept different situations or different contextual details as parameters.

The upshot is that lying is pretty much never allowed under Kant's arguments, but other things (such as killing another human being) can sometimes slip through depending on the context. Although, off the top of my head, I can't think of a good example where the CI would allow for murder.

Answer 4

The thing is the Cognitive Imperative is a rule used to govern other non-universal rules. For instance one version of Kant's CI states that humans must not be seen as a means to an end, but must instead be considered an end themselves. Essentially it is a rule stating that one cannot use other people merely for personal gain. This rule can be used to govern all other rules without contradiction.

On the other hand if your rule requires adherence to multiple specific behaviors, rather than an abstract goal like in the CI, it can be shown to be false. For instance one may believe it is universally wrong to lie, and universally wrong to kill. However one can then face a situation where if they do not lie, someone will die. In this scenario no course of action would be considered acceptable, and thus the ethical system demanding one never lies and never kills is illogical.

Answer 5

I do not think Kant would take issue with your position on the basis that you must think lying in general is okay; rather, he would reaffirm the logical integrity of his own rule or measure, preferring logical integrity as a basis of decision making, over and above utilitarian considerations. I do not think he would be committing a logical fallacy, since I do not think he would take issue with your position by means of accusing you personally of lacking personal integrity - simply that he would prefer his own measure because, in contrast to utilitarian considerations, it generates a rule of logical consistency and integrity and upholds a common picture of what every person is owed by every other person (say, truthfulness), ruling out from the start any deviations from that measure