In philosophy, there is much mention of the intension/extension distinction. Two properties can be extensionally equal but not intensionally equal. It is very easy to define when two properties are extensionally, but I have never seen a satisfactory definition of intensional identity. Has anyone defined it?

  • 1
    Can you mention what unsatisfactory ones you've seen and briefly explain why you find them unsatisfactory? – virmaior Oct 2 '17 at 7:40
  • 1
    It's possible for two things to be equivalent without being equal; one simple-minded definition of equivalent intensions is they give equal extensions; I'll be interested to see what answers come up - good question. – Mozibur Ullah Oct 2 '17 at 7:58
  • Have you tried with the review in SEP: Intensional Logic ? There are many references to recent developments. – Mauro ALLEGRANZA Oct 2 '17 at 13:12

Your Answer

By clicking “Post Your Answer”, you agree to our terms of service, privacy policy and cookie policy

Browse other questions tagged or ask your own question.