Lately, I have been reading some of Quine's works on modality. I can't help but feel that many of his pronouncements on modality are wrong/misguided, although pinpointing exactly where is goes wrong is proving rather difficult. For instance, in The Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic and Reference and Modality, he seems to defines necessity as follows:
Where p is any proposition, "Necessarily, p" is true if and only if "p" is an analytic statement.
This way of viewing necessity seems to undergird many of the problems with, and objections to, modality that he identifies, particularly because he doesn't take kindly to the notion of analyticity. But defining necessity in terms of analyticity just seems plain wrong. I believe it is safe to say that every analytic statement is necessary, but I don't think the converse is true. I think I have a counterexample. "the morning star = the evening star" is true as a fact of astronomical discovery. According to Ruth Barcan, if "x=y" is true, then "necessarily x=y" is true. Thus "necessarily the morning star = the evening star" is true. But certainly the statement "the morning star = the evening star" is not analytic, which Frege realized long before Quine was even a philosopher.
Does this sound right? If so, why didn't Quine see such a simple counterexample? Would he not think it is a genuine counterexample? If so, how would he respond to the above argument.
Also: I am having trouble seeing the difference between saying "Necessarily, p" and " 'p' is necessarily true." . Quine seems to think there is a difference, which is most evident in his paper "Three Grades of Modal Involvement." He says of one (not sure which of the two) that it is a statement operator, while the other is a semantical predicate. However, I am having trouble seeing the difference between using necessarily in those two ways.