To my knowledge, the correspondence theory of truth posits that a proposition is true iff there are states of affairs that reflect what the proposition indicates. E.g. "Snow is white" is true iff snow is actually white; truth becomes a property that arises from the mirroring of states of affairs in propositions. But how is this different from deflationism? Isn't "'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white" begging the question of what "iff snow is white" means? I'm confused on what the difference is between these accounts of truth as deflationism just seems like a shorthand for using correspondence as a central truth criterion. To say "'Snow is white' iff snow is white" means the same thing as its correspondence counterpart.

  • See The Deflationary Theory of Truth: the first para comments on this. – Mauro ALLEGRANZA Oct 11 '17 at 7:24
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    Deflated "'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white" does not beg the question because it does not purport to explicate meanings. It just says that "A is true" is a verbal device for asserting A, especially in indirect contexts. Correspondence theory, on the other hand, does require "snow is white" in the second half to "express the facts", in other words it presupposes explication of its meaning, e.g. of its truth conditions. The phrase sounds the same but the second half means very different things, see SEP discussion. – Conifold Oct 11 '17 at 19:43

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