After the Cold War, analytic philosophy gradually began to return to metaphysics. Some important figures in this movement include Saul Kripke, Alvin Plantinga, and Ruth Barcan, who made important contributions to modal logic and the linguistic analysis of necessity and possibility; David Lewis, a student of Quine's who developed a kind of radical empiricist metaphysics; and Peter Strawson, who developed an approach he called "descriptive metaphysics," a kind of descriptive unpacking of the metaphysical assumptions of natural language.
Importantly, this movement happened at the same time as philosophy of science moved out of the "core" of analytic philosophy — logic, philosophy of language, epistemology, and later metaphysics — and became a more distinct subfield of academic philosophy. While philosophy of science was absolutely central to German-speaking[*] analytic philosophers before the rise of the Nazis, today there is relatively little interaction between "core" analytic philosophy and philosophy of science.
[*] Philosophy of science was much less central for major Anglophone analytic philosophers. Bertrand Russell's contributions to logic were important, but he didn't really engage with empirical science. As far as I can recall, G.E. Moore and A.J. Ayer had even less contact with science, and neither wrote any significant work in what we would consider philosophy of science.
Today there is some work in metaphysics within philosophy of science. Two philosophers of physics, Ladyman and Ross, published Every Thing Must Go in 2007, a kind of polemic against analytic metaphysics and for metaphysics based on (philosophy of) science, especially (philosophy of) physics. This stimulated several conferences, as well as an anthology titled Scientific Metaphysics. The second paragraph of that review suggests that there is relatively little contact between scientific metaphysics and analytic metaphysics.