What are Kant's adiaphora?

Question

Studying Kant's Perpetual Peace I happened to notice the concept of adiaphora. Further investigations brought up almost nothing: There are several references to adiaphora in Kant's work that clearly contradict each other.

But that man can be called fantastically virtuous who allows nothing to be morally indifferent (adiaphora) and strews all his steps with duties, as with man-traps; it is not indifferent to him whether I eat meat or fish, drink beer or wine, supposing that both agree with me. Fantastic virtue is a concern with petty details [Mikrologie ] which, were it admit- ted into the doctrine of virtue, would turn the government of virtue into tyranny. (Metaphysics of Morals, The Doctrine of Virtue, XVI)

It is, however, of great consequence to ethics in general to avoid admitting, so long as it is possible, of anything morally intermediate, whether in actions (adiophora) or in human characters; for with such ambiguity all maxims are in danger of forfeiting their precision and stability. Those who are partial to this strict mode of thinking are usually called rigorists (a name which is intended to carry reproach, but which actually praises); their opposites may be called latitudinarians. (Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, Book I, Observation)

German Wiki on adiaphora is linked to the entry on rigorism which states, quoting the second passage from above, that Kant was rigorous for he didn't admit of anything "morally intermediate". This seems simply impossible, for even in the Perpetual Peace he thinks about what kind of acts are touched by the permissive law, and mentions adiaphora. Another book I consulted on this, unfortunately only available in German, states that the ones denying adiaphora in Kant's philosophy simply mistake "morally intermediate" things for adiaphora, and claims they aren't the same.

Hopefully you can see why I am confused. I think this is a really interesting topic, but I don't know where to look further. I am not asking about the concept of adiaphora here, which, as I am told, is a stoic and later catholic concept, neither am I asking for references in other philosophies - I am solely interested in Kant's understanding of morally indifferent acts. I will be grateful for all kinds of sources and references on-topic.

Answer 1

But that man can be called fantastically virtuous who allows nothing to be morally indifferent (adiaphora) and strews all his steps with duties, as with man-traps; it is not indifferent to him whether I eat meat or fish, drink beer or wine, supposing that both agree with me. Fantastic virtue is a concern with petty details [Mikrologie ] which, were it admitted into the doctrine of virtue, would turn the government of virtue into tyranny. (Metaphysics of Morals, The Doctrine of Virtue, XVI)

In this passage Kant asserts that a morality that concerns itself with minute particulars of behaviour becomes tyrannical. He calls this kind of virtue fantastic in the sense of 'outlandish' rather than 'great'. Somehow, an excess of virtue is transmuted into its opposite; so what is superficially is a virtue, is in reality, not. Kant, here, is sounding a strong note of caution. He may also have used the adjective fantastic to mean that this kind of virtue is actually a fantasy, a state of affairs that is impossible to obtain; for when one is pointed to such a possible state of affairs in the world, one discerns on closer examination that some lattiude is always possible.

It is, however, of great consequence to ethics in general to avoid admitting, so long as it is possible, of anything morally intermediate, whether in actions (adiophora) or in human characters; for with such ambiguity all maxims are in danger of forfeiting their precision and stability. Those who are partial to this strict mode of thinking are usually called rigorists (a name which is intended to carry reproach, but which actually praises); their opposites may be called latitudinarians. (Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, Book I, Observation)

Now, Kant looks at a virtuous reason for an excess of virtue, rather than a malicious reason; that is clarity, 'precision' and 'stability' - these concerns are particularly evident when morality is framed in law. (A malicious reason would be to use morality, in effect, to police or tyrannise society).

German Wiki on adiaphora is linked to the entry on rigorism which states, quoting the second passage from above, that Kant was rigorous for he didn't admit of anything "morally intermediate"

This, is a strange reading; just going on the basis of the first passage, Kant warns against morality applied to every & all actions; that is what he calls fantastic virtue.

Kant, on the basis of these two passages, could be called rigourous, when one takes into account the full meaning of what he says. That is, it is of great consequence to disallow morally intermediate actions, so long as it is possible. The lattitude inherent in possibility is the bridge that connects the opposite sentiments of the two passages.

In one sense, Kant can be said to be not morally indifferent about morally indifferent acts; for he says that they should remain so; to become rigorous here is to become tyrannical.