There is an issue that blurs my head. For instance, lets have a proposition p that says: “X is round”. X is a symbol that we could mark something into. If we say X is an orange fruit, then the proposition p would be true. But if we say X is a book, proposition p would be false. But we cannot just say the proposition p that is “X is round“ is false, because we must first mark some value into X.
Now the thing that blurs my head is this: What makes our daily life words different from X in the proposition p? Our words that we use in our daily life can’t be just like symbol X? When we say “the desk is beautiful”, as we disscussed if “beautiful” is just a symbol, than we would have to mark a value into word beautiful to speak about the truth value of “beautifulness of the desk”.
Well, I think the facts won’t be changing with my definitions of beautifulness. But by definitions of words like beautifulness, my and others’ mindview about the world will change. And I think this is an important matter. When we are discussing something fundamental like good, value or as I said beautifulness, for me that kind of problems are appearing. That makes me wonder, how can we be sure about whether or not we are dealing with meaningful problems in philosophy?