It is sometimes debated whether it is possible for particular acts or maxims, or acts or maxims in general, to have intrinsic value: whether they can be nonderivatively good. E.g. Is telling the truth intrinsically right? Is killing intrinsically wrong?
It is taken for granted that extrinsic values exist, e.g. it follows from lying being intrinsically wrong that lying to Jane about not being able to attend the party is extrinsically wrong.
However, I find it somewhat plausible that all rights and wrongs are intrinsic, where each act or maxim has its own intrinsic value, not dependent on any sort of syllogism with more general acts or maxims. Lying to Jane may have been intrinsically right or wrong, it may be that an exception was made for this particular case, or that the general act of lying cannot have an intrinsic value, and that there are only specific intrinsic values. In essence, there is no such thing as an extrinsic value.
Yet, all this feels uncomfortable, are there any arguments that address this sort of extrinsic value denial?