Reading the paper Gettier and Factivity in Indo‐Tibetan Epistemology the author claims at some point early in the paper that
There are two initial problems which make it difficult to compare factive assessment with true belief and the Gettier problem. The first is that factive assessment is held to be a specific typeof mental episode, whereas true belief is not. No one thinks that true belief is a particular type of mental state different from (mere) belief. Yes, some beliefs are true and others are false; but this distinction applies to the content of beliefs, and not to the mental state of belief. The second problem is that the justified true belief analysis of knowledge is quite remote from Indo-Tibetan epistemology, and so finding a parallel to ‘justification’ within this context is not straightforward. This problem is compounded by the fact that if we are to attribute theories of justification to Indo-Tibetan epistemologists, many of these theories will need to be externalist in nature. Externalists commonly eschew the justified true belief model of knowledge, however.
I shall discuss both of these two issues at greater length in subsequent portions of this paper. For the time being, I shall temporarily ignore these two problems, so that I can draw closer comparisons between Tibetan examples of factive assessment and both Gettier cases and genuine examples of inferential knowledge. By detailing each of the various subtypes of factive assessment discussed by Tibetan thinkers, I can show better where Gettier cases would be located in this typology, and why Tibetan typologies of factive assessment do not provide Gettier situations. While this discussion focuses entirely on the Tibetan notion of factive assessment, I believe that it is possible to generalize from this single case to a much broader domain of the Indo-Tibetan tradition of epistemology, and conclude that there are no relevant analogues of Gettier cases.
Now I am interested in what this extension would consist of. Would it consider new cases of assessments? Or would it be a meta paradigm that encompasses all (in the Indo-Tibetan tradition?