In a nutshell, the Anselm Ontological Argument states that given a God defined as "a being than which none greater can be imagined" it follows that this God must exist.
It seems to me that this argument can easily fall apart with the following reasoning:
Irrespective of the exact meaning of the adjective “greater”, there will be many properties contributing to being greater and other properties that are not related. For instance, being beautiful, being strong and having the power to blow up planets could be all properties contributing to being greater, therefore God would be the most beautiful, the strongest and would have the power to destroy planets. On the opposite side, being funny or being black haired are not properties that make any difference for being greater (this depends on the definition of greater of course, but given a definition there will always be properties that are not related).
Now, “existing in reality” is a property that an entity can have or not have. There are two possibilities, either “existing in reality” is a property contributing to being greater or it’s not.
If not, then there is no implication greater —> “existing in reality”.
If yes, then the argument is circular, since we postulated what we wanted to prove.
Are there any flaws in this reasoning?