When I ask this question, I'm specifically referencing ideas posited by theorists like Michael Sandel (The Tanner Lectures - What Money Can't Buy), Elizabeth Anderson (The Ethical Limitations of the Market / Is Women's Labor a Commodity?), Margaret Jane Radin (Market-Inalienability), Michael Walzer (Spheres of Justice), Anne Phillips (It's My Body and I'll Do What I Like With It: Bodies as Objects and Property), Alvin E. Roth (Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets), etc.
When we discuss the moral limits of markets, and how we should define our conceptions of justice (in relation to these markets) in political philosophy, it seems to me like much of the current debate over the argument from corruption is deeply intertwined with moral philosophy. By the argument from corruption, I reference those arguments in which individuals are concerned over a contested commodity's permissibility and legal status (i.e. kidneys, sex, surrogacy, etc.). Michael Sandel, for instance, places an importance on the republican notion of citizenship when he says that, "A politics that emphasizes the civic consequences of inequality may hold greater promise of inspiring the reconstruction of class-mixing public institutions than a politics that focuses on individual choice" (pg. 121 of What Money Can't Buy). He contrasts the character-building nature of the republic conception of citizenship with the freedom/tolerance-protecting attitudes of liberalism (which might, in his eyes, lead us to condone the sales of things that could harm our civic bond with one another as democratic citizens). It seems that Sandel's concern, along with other philosophers concerned with the argument from corruption (such as Elizabeth Anderson's fears regarding the potential threat that commercial surrogacy holds against the value of motherhood) are concerned at their core with concepts of the flourishing human life, and moral issues of what is right and wrong.
But if this is the case, then how can we possibly differentiate this aspect of political philosophy from being a concern that rather belongs to the sphere of moral philosophy or ethics? It seems hard for me to believe that this stance can be taken seriously while in the context of our politically-pluralistic society.
*Edit: my question might be phrased badly. It might have been more appropriate had I asked, "Must political philosophy and moral philosophy differ (in the context of moral limits on the market) in order for arguments from corruption to be valid?" But that's a little long-winded. *