When studying AI, computationalism was always referred to as a theory, a theory of mind, the theory that the mind is an executing computation. But is it really a theory? How could it be disproved or disconfirmed? If a certain computation (program, algorithm) turns out to be unintelligent, that just means the right computation has yet to be discovered. The idea that the mind is a computation isn't challenged. What experiment could disconfirm the computational mind?
The theory of phlogiston says combustible material contains a substance, phlogiston, that leaves during burning, hence the lesser weight of the ash, etc. This idea could be disconfirmed – and was: magnesium ash weighed more than the unburned metal. What empirical test could disconfirm computationalism? If there's no such experiment, can computationalism properly be called a scientific theory? If not, can the research project based on it – AI – be a scientific project?