This seems to be a variation on a Gettier problem where Gettier problems pose issues for justified true belief as a definition of knowledge.
Here the poles are reversed and you're asking whether something is a lie if you intended to provide what you believed was false information but end up providing true information due to state changes you were unaware of.
Whether what you did is a "lie" hinges on where the priority lies in defining a lie. To a first approximation, let's start with:
(L) A lie is an intentional untruth.
On this immediate definition, there's actually an ambiguity as to whether what you said qualifies as a lie hidden in the word "untruth."
The question is whether "untruth" means that you (a) know something is true and state the opposite or (b) state something that is not true or (c) whether the phrase only works as "intentional untruth." If "intentional" and "untruth" are separable than what you said is not a lie since it won't meet the condition of being an untruth.
To see whether they should be separable, we need a theory of why lying is wrong (assuming it is). If we look at Kant's theory, we would hold that lying is wrong because it does not give what is due to a rational being (the truth for their decision-making process). On Kant and similar theories, what you did still seems to qualify as a lie, because you intended to leave the recipient with misinformation (see MM's definition of lying).
Before stopping there, however, it's important to realize that it might still not be a lie in the moral sense on Kant's picture (or on Hegel's for that matter). To understand why we have to look at Kant's quodlibetal questions about lying. Here, we'll find that Kant doesn't think you are lying when you engage in social niceties like telling someone they look okay when it's socially the correct thing to do.
Here, we can distinguish between a friend or acquaintance bumming a cigarette from you and the cops asking if you have any cigarettes. Presumably, the purpose of the former question is "do you have any cigarettes that I can have?" and the latter is more a question of the true fact of the matter. Given this qualifier, it may not be lying even for Kant to say "no, I don't" when the real question being asked is whether or not they can have one.
The analyses for lying will work out differently for other common theories. Virtue ethics would seem disposed to say that you are "lying" insofar as your dispositionally harming your character by gaining a pattern of not being truthful.