Is evolutionary "morality" really the same thing as human morality?

Question

In a different question I asked, Chris Johns' answer pinpointed exactly why all of the answers didn't satisfy me, so I'd like to ask a follow-up question which will further focus my question - would you consider bees moral?

All the answers in my first question were not about actual morality in my opinion, but of the group effort to stay alive. This isn't morality. Morality, to my opinion, is the goal-less (there's probably a better term) care for the other. It's not even selflessness (even though this is the closest one and the best answer so far), because even selflessness, in the evolutionary mindset, comes from the need to live, not from true selfless-needing.

For example, a parent will die for its child, in order to preserve its gene, and you might call it morality. But what I call morality is the soldier that jumps on a grenade in order to save his fellow soldier/s (or civilians, or even in the extreme case of saving soldiers from the enemy side). That solider doesn't sacrifice himself for the greater good, his genes aren't inferior to the other human being, so, in the evolution mind - he shouldn't (or better said - wouldn't) sacrifice himself. Doing so isn't evolutionary right.

Correct me if I'm wrong.

Answer 1

First off, evolution is a process that is always ongoing. One cannot chose to act "evolutionary right" or "evolutionary wrong". Also, evolution has no goal. It is simply the observation and theory that stronger species tend to survive over weaker species. Finally, evolution is a process that is much broader and takes much longer than a parent dying for his child or other specific events. So you would not be able to use an evolution-based argument to argue that the morality of the generation n is stronger than that of generation n – 1.

When somebody dies for others that is not a standalone decision. I'm not an expert, but in the decision-making process in the brain many similar situations that you have encountered or thought about are weighed and considered to make a decision for the particular situation you are in - and all that happens more or less unconsciously.

A moral framework helps to make sense of all these experiences; it helps to make sense of the world. Otherwise, how would you understand why somebody behaves the way he does? It also works the other way around: by experiencing behaviour, you inductively build an understanding of the moral framework of others. And you use that understanding to develop your own moral framework, based on your esteem of the others.

A moral framework can be based on care for others but can also be based on egocentrism, care for the climate or the fact that you always want to see as much green as possible. Care for others is just one possible objective. However, it is one that is taught to children in many cultures.

The proponents of an evolutionary morality would argue that that is because caring for others is evolutionary stronger than other moral frameworks. Thus, the fact that you consider selflessly sacrificing yourself for others a moral and goal-less act is, according to them, the result of the evolutionary process. The species that thinks caring for others is good and selfless was stronger than the species that thought otherwise, or the species that did not think about morality at all.

Answer 2

You presented a specific set of claims of contemporary evolutionary moral theory, but I think there are different set of claims you don't acknowledge. It is not that the soldier sacrifices himself because someone else in the group has genes are better, nor is it the narrow case of the parent sacrificing himself for the close genetic relative, the child. Rather, the claim is that everyone in the group has a certain inclination towards (occasional) self-sacrifice for the larger good, because groups with that quality do better over the long term than groups without it. Morals, so the theory goes, do not always help us personally, but they do always help the larger groups of which we are a part.

It is important to note that accepting this does entail a significant, and not uncontroversial shift away from the selfish-gene model of evolution acting solely (or at least primarily) on individual agents (most closely associated with science popularist Richard Dawkins). In terms of the conversation around evolution, it represents a pendulum shift back towards an endorsement of large-group dynamics as playing a legitimate role in evolutionary processes. In some ways, however, the two points of view are not as opposed as they may seem. After all, all human beings are 99.9% genetically identical, so even helping a completely unrelated stranger is in the interest of the vast majority of your genes.

As far as your other question, I'd personally be happy to accept an argument that bees are moral. For me, however, the paradigmatic example of a moral, non-human agent is the mitochondria. Generous, enabling all higher life through their abundant production of energy; humble, doing their ceaseless work quietly and unobtrusively; and with unparalleled integrity, maintaining their own independent existence despite millions of years of coevolution; if any creature deserves the title "moral" it is the mitochondria. Unlike many, however, I don't see this, however, as reducing human morality to biological processes, but rather as revealing morality as a fundamental feature of our universe, towards which all things apparently incline.

Answer 3

As was pointed out yesterday, in the extreme situation, there is no time to reflect. Hence, we must be programmed (instinct, non-reflective) to act "as if" ALL others are valuable for species survival. We see that in calm times, the surgeon may be more valuable than the ditch-digger (that is, in the calculating, reflective, instrumental, immoral world). But in extreme situations we must act as if all are equally valuable because there is no time to reflect.

In the extreme moment, we must save all in order to save the potential one who will advance the species.

Objection: not all soldiers jump on the grenade, so it can't be instinct. Answer: They have, in their spare time, in preparation for battle etc., taken the time to calculate. They anticipate the emergency situation, and engage the everyday, instrumental thinking. The neo-cortex overcomes the instinct to save the other in extremis.

Now what about this instrumental, "goal-for", world of everydayness?

In this world not only other men but nature itself (and this is key) we see as mere instruments to be used for self-survival. Now let's trace the moves: Freud, "Civilization and its Discontents"; Marcuse answers many years later: "Eros and Civilization" and "One-Dimensional Man". The solution, advanced by Marcuse, to pacify but satisfy man in his relation to nature is probably no longer possible for external reasons due to unanticipated changes in nature itself. This era of possibility may have closed, we don't know yet, but it may have closed.

Hence some say man must continue to take an instrumental approach towards other men and towards nature for his own survival, which ironically may hasten his demise. (Self-preservation = self-destruction).

While Marcuse proposed solutions, Horkheimer, Adorno, and Heidegger said merely "stop", "halt" (an over-simplification but a warranted over-simplification I think).

We may in some sense be "back to Kant" (again), and the hope for a morality of ends.