I'm kind of struggling with this. My prof gave an example of the problem of whether or not holes exist.
In the case of a colander, a realist about holes could say that a colander is metal that has holes in it. An anti-realist, however, would have to paraphrase and say that a colander is metal which is perforated. Due to Quine's theory, he is not ontologically committed to holes existing, just perforation.
But if perforation means to have holes, then what is the difference? I see the distinction, but how can that hold up under anything. Why is saying those two sentences not just saying the exact same thing? All my prof said was that because one says perforation exists, and one says holes exist. But I do not understand why this is acceptable, if for perforation to exist holes must also exist (correct?) due to the fact that for something to be perforated means for it to have holes in it.