Bernard D'Espagnat in this article in Scientific American writes:
Of the three premises realism is the most fundamental. Realism can be stated formally as the belief that a mere description of data is not all that should be required of a theory. Even an empirical rule for predicting the patterns of future measurements is not enough. The mind demands something more: not necessarily determinism-there is nothing intrinsically irrational about randomness-but at least objective explanations of observed regularities, or in other words causes. Underlying this demand is the intuitive notion that the world outside the self is real and has at least some properties that exist independently of human consciousness.
The last sentence appears uncontentious: There was a time when there were no human beings and yet the universe existed. Thus the universe is independent of human consciousness. However this objection seems such an easy one to make that there must be other good reasons why some are prepared to countenance a mind-dependent universe even on physical grounds and why they forego the previous objection. It seems plausible that a distinction has to be made between mind-indepedent and human-mind-independent, and its the latter that the forgoing objection disposes of. Is this it, or am I missing something else more fundamental here? If so, what are they?