I can't be the only one who finds this strange. Section 7 of Anthropology from a Pragmatic Perspective, entitled "On Sensibility in contrast to understanding", reads as follows:
In regard to the state of its representations, my mind is either active and exhibits a faculty (facultas), or it is passive and consists in receptivity (receptivitas). A cognition contains both joined together, and the possibility of having such a cognition bears the name of cognitive faculty - from the most distinguished part of this faculty, namely, the activity of mind in combining or separating representations from one another.
Representations in regard to which the mind behaves passively, and by means of which the subject is therefore affected (whether it *affects itself or is affected by an object), belong to the sensuous cognitive faculty. But ideas that comprise a sheer activity (thinking) belong to the intellectual cognitive faculty. The former is also called the lower, the latter, the higher cognitive faculty. The lower cognitive faculty has the character of passivity of the inner sense of sensations; the higher, of spontaneity of apperception, that is, of pure consciousness of the activity that constitutes thinking. It belongs to logic ( a system of rules of the understanding), as the former belongs to psychology (a sum of all inner perceptions under laws of nature) and establishes inner experience.
So, even when I'm just staring idly at the wall painted red, both cognitive faculties are at work, the one receiving the sensations of the red wall, the other applying all the rules of time and space, etc to it so that I can recognize that I'm looking at a red wall. That's Kant right? The gist is, affection and intellection submit to two entirely different rule sets. Affection follows the laws of nature, and so has a physiological basis, but intellection submits to the rules of logic (which is carefully defined in a separate book, appropriately titled Logic). So while in function, the two faculties are the same, structurally they are distinct. But that would mean that the laws of nature don't command all of reality, or at least, as far as Kant goes, the laws of nature are incapable of eventually accounting for intellection! Hang on, there's evidence, and this is where things get really tricky.
In the handwritten manuscript to Anthropology, Kant crossed out, and so didn't publish, a whole subsequent section which clarifies some of the ambiguities of this idea of cognition. The chunk of it deals with the weirdness of claiming, following these distinctions, that human beings can never know themselves in themselves (an-sich):
In the self-cognition of the human being through inner experience he does not make what he has perceived in himself, for this depends on impressions (the subject matter of representations) that he receives. Therefore he is so far enduring, that is, he has a representation of himself as he is affected by himself, which according to its form depends merely on the subjectivity property of his nature, which should be interpreted as belonging to the object, even though he still also has the right to attribute it to the object (here he is own person), but with the qualification that he can only recognize himself as an object through his representation in experience as he appears to himself, not as he, the observed, is in himself. - If he wished to cognize the latter way, he would have to rely on a consciousness of pure spontaneity (the concept of freedom), (which is also possible), but it would still not be perception of inner sense and the empirical cognition of his inner self (inner experience) which is based on it. Rather it can only be consciousness of the rule of his actions and omissions, without thereby acquiring a theoretical (physiological) cognition of his nature, which is what psychology actually aims at. - Empirical self-cognition therefore presents to inner sense the human being as he appears to it, not as he is in himself, because every cognition explains merely the affectability of the subject, not the inner characteristic of the subject as object.
and further on:
One must therefore distinguish pure apperception (of the understanding) from empirical apperception (of sensibility). The latter, when the subject attends to himself, is also at the same time affected and so calls out sensations in him, that is, brings representations to consciousness.
But that doesn't make any sense! If I perceive myself through inner sense, even if these are filtered as representations, the fact alone that the 'I' is self-affecting means that the distinction between pure and empirical can't hold, unless I have a soul that just happens to be hanging out with body. Like, isn't this is a solution Aristotle deemed laughable in De Anima? If pure and empirical apperception aren't the same thing then bodies are completely interchangeable. And if I'm self-affectable through inner sense, then what keeps pure apperception from being just another representation aside from Kant just asserting that it's not the case, and that something, completely unbeholden to the laws of nature, is there instead?
I'm not a grad student or professional or anything, just an amateur enthusiast for philosophy, so forgive me if I'm misreading what;s going in Kant. Thanks for the assistance, whatever it may be.