Have read the book and still unable to finalize the answer
Popper did not accept the delineation between normal and extraordinary science. He looked at it as one grand continuum of hypotheses from the most mundane of fine-tuning computations to highly confrontational propositions that audaciously challenge all the surrounding work.
So he would see Kuhn's 'normal science' as a good thing, but not as the best thing. The best thing, for him would be for common scientific processes to mature through normal refinement, but occasionally contain highly audacious confrontational propositions.
However, Kuhn showed that historically, what Popper expects to arise from a grand contradiction simply does not happen very often. If the confrontation is too great, the new hypothesis, even if well tested, is not integrated into the science.
There is a shared, underlying set of unassailable propositions that constitute the paradigm of a productive science. To alter the paradigm, not only must there be available and compelling contradictions, but the existing normal science must be decreasing in its return on investment. Otherwise the contradiction sits there unintegrated, or gathers a small number of obsessive vindicators, until the rest of the science is ready for it.
Having never accepted this argument, Popper would maintain that what he originally proposed would still be best. If science were consistent and fully rational, it should work that way, even if it historically doesn't. The parochialism that the idea of a stable paradigm implies seems inappropriate to a process that could otherwise be described by a simpler and more directly rational process.