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Have read the book and still unable to finalize the answer

closed as unclear what you're asking by Conifold, Tim B II, Mark Andrews, Swami Vishwananda, Frank Hubeny Feb 24 '18 at 17:10

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    Which book are you referring to? – CriglCragl Feb 14 '18 at 23:23
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    Hi, welcome to Philosophy SE. Please visit our Help Center to see what questions we answer and how to ask. One-line posts are discouraged because it is hard to tell from them what people are looking for. Please provide the title of the book and explain what you have so far and what prevents you from finalizing it. – Conifold Feb 14 '18 at 23:36
  • Popper wrote more than one book, so it would be useful to say which one you are referring to. – Mozibur Ullah Feb 15 '18 at 3:07
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    Kuhn does not assert that normal science is a "good thing". He asserts that normal science is the "normal" way for science to work. – Mauro ALLEGRANZA Feb 15 '18 at 10:29
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Popper did not accept the delineation between normal and extraordinary science. He looked at it as one grand continuum of hypotheses from the most mundane of fine-tuning computations to highly confrontational propositions that audaciously challenge all the surrounding work.

So he would see Kuhn's 'normal science' as a good thing, but not as the best thing. The best thing, for him would be for common scientific processes to mature through normal refinement, but occasionally contain highly audacious confrontational propositions.

However, Kuhn showed that historically, what Popper expects to arise from a grand contradiction simply does not happen very often. If the confrontation is too great, the new hypothesis, even if well tested, is not integrated into the science.

There is a shared, underlying set of unassailable propositions that constitute the paradigm of a productive science. To alter the paradigm, not only must there be available and compelling contradictions, but the existing normal science must be decreasing in its return on investment. Otherwise the contradiction sits there unintegrated, or gathers a small number of obsessive vindicators, until the rest of the science is ready for it.

Having never accepted this argument, Popper would maintain that what he originally proposed would still be best. If science were consistent and fully rational, it should work that way, even if it historically doesn't. The parochialism that the idea of a stable paradigm implies seems inappropriate to a process that could otherwise be described by a simpler and more directly rational process.

  • Or as Planck put it: "A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die" – CriglCragl Feb 15 '18 at 17:56